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ARTICLES
COMMUNITY EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN
PETROLEUM VENTURES: PATH TO
ECONOMIC GROWTH?
EMEKA DURUIGBO*
INTRODUCTION
Africa is a continent that contains fifty-four countries and, in 2010,
had an estimated population of more than 854 million people.' The
upstream oil industry is pivotal to Africa's development. According
to the 2012 BP Statistical Energy Survey, Africa had proven oil
reserves of 132.4 billion barrels at the end of 2011 or 8.0% of the
world's reserves.2 In 2011, the region produced about 8,804 barrels of
crude oil per day, 10.4% of the world's total and a negative change of
12.8% compared to 10,114 barrels of oil per day in 2010, primarily due
to the turbulence in Libya during the early part of 2011.1 In 2011, the
downstream oil industry had a total refinery capacity of 3,317 barrels
per day which represents 3.6% of the world's total.4 The major refin-
ing centers are in Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Mo-
rocco, and Kenya, in a decreasing magnitude of refining capacity as a
percentage of total African capacity.5 South Africa also has synfuels
* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. A
version of this paper was presented at the R.J. Reynolds Symposium at North Carolina Central
University School of Law on April 13, 2012. Special thanks to Professor Wendy Scott for the
invitation and to panelists and participants for spirited discussions. Many thanks to Elvis
Angyiembe for extraordinary resourcefulness and Shamia Cottrell and Iveoma Okparaeke for
exceptional research assistance.
1. Duncan Kennedy, African Poverty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 205, 226 (2012) (listing Africa's
2010 population as 854,951,000); Anouk Zijlma, Facts about Africa: Africa Facts - Fun Facts,
Geography Facts, Travel Facts, AaouT.com, http://goafrica.about.com/od/africatraveltips/alaf
ricafacts.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (stating that South Sudan became the newest African
country on July 9, 2011 and Africa has fifty-four countries and a few disputed territories).
2. BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY (June 2012) at 6, available at http://www.
bp.com/assets/bp internet/globalbp/globalbp-uk-english/reports-and-publications/statistical
energy-review 2011/STAGING/local assets/pdf/statistical-review of world.energy-full-report
2012.pdf.
3. Id. at 1, 8.
4. Id. at 16.
5. See Oil Refining in Africa - Overview, MBENDI.COM, http://www.mbendi.com/indy/oilg/
ogrf/af/p0005.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
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production.6 At the end of 2011, Africa had 513.2 trillion cubic feet of
proven natural gas reserves representing 7.0% of the world's total.7
Africa produced 202.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2011which
was a share of 6.2% of the world's total.8 This number represents
slightly more than a 5% decrease from 2010 and was primarily ac-
counted for by a sharp decline in Libyan natural gas production.' Re-
cent exploration activities on the east coast of Africa, including
Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, have unearthed massive
quantities of oil and gas.10 Another remarkable fact is that Africa is a
major source of petroleum imports for the United States and other
developed economies."1
The flurry of activities following the new oil and gas discoveries has
led to what some commentators refer to as the "Second Scramble for
Africa." 12 It is not clear what the final result will look like. For Afri-
cans, the development of oil and gas is associated with significant per-
sonal safety and environmental risks. For investors in the oil and gas
industry in Africa, there is a dire need to assure the safety not only of
their financial investments, but of their personnel and physical assets
as well. For the international community, there is a veritable interest
in the security of supplies and conflict management. In March 2012, a
natural resource-focused seminar held in Uganda posed a pertinent
question: "How do we ensure that Africans benefit maximally, equita-
6. See Oil Refining in South Africa - Synfuels, MBENDI.COM, http://www.mbendi.com/
indy/oilg/ogrf/af/sa/p0025.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) ("The use of synthesis technology to
produce fuels is not widely practiced. However, in Africa an unusually large oil-from-coal syn-
thesis industry has developed for fuels and chemicals due to the unique political history of South
Africa.").
7. BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, supra note 2, at 20.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id.
10. See Africa: Recent Oil and Gas Discoveries Reveal Africa's Eastern Promise, AL-
LAFRICA.COM (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201210091147.html?aa
source=acrdn-f0; Tom Bergin, East Africa to Join World Gas Giants, REUTERS, May 20, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/20/africa-gas-idUSL5E8GGIK620120520.
11. See Elise Aiken, Energy Justice: Achieving Stability in Oil-Producing African Nations,
22 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 293, 293 (2011) ("Currently, the United States imports
fifteen percent of its oil from West Africa, mainly from Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Equatorial
Guinea, and while overall crude imports declined in recent years because of the economic down-
turn, the percentage of oil imports from Africa is expected to increase steadily.") (citations
omitted).
12. See Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa's Oil and Mineral Re-
sources: Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT'L LAw. 193 (2008); Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade, Empires,
and Subjects-China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade Arrangement, or the Third Scramble for
Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 543 (2008); Dustin N. Sharp, Requiem For A Pipe-
dream: Oil, The World Bank, And The Need For Human Rights Assessments, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 379, 385 (2011) (noting Chinese and Indian interest in African oil and gas); But see Jedrzej
George Frynas & Manuel Paulo, A New Scramble For African Oil? Historical, Political, And
Business Perspectives, 106 AFR. Ave. 229 (2007) (cautioning against referring to the development
as a scramble for Africa).
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bly and sustainably from the continent's natural resource riches?""
While the seminar organizers and participants acknowledge that the
question is not a new one, they recognize that satisfactory answers
have been elusive.1 4 At the same time, the need for effective policy
prescriptions remains imperative. In the past few years, a number of
energy policy models have been proposed or implemented in Africa.
This article contributes to identifying solutions to the problems of mis-
use and mismanagement of Africa's resources by proposing the addi-
tion of community equity participation in petroleum ventures and a
short list of viable policy options.
The need for this new approach is evident from the lacunae in the
present policy framework and occasioned by significant impediments
associated with many of the implemented or proposed policy options.
One such problem is the absence of control or ownership rights. A
collective criticism leveled at some of the initiatives aimed at
favorable development outcomes, such as the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI)", is that these pro-development initia-
tives seek to focus on "'flashpoint" or headline-grabbing corporate re-
sponsibility issues such as corruption, human rights abuse by security
personnel and armed conflict, "but do not address the underlying root
causes of community opposition to extractive industry projects, in-
cluding communities' lack of control over their own destinies and the
natural resources they consider their own."16 Additionally, many ex-
13. ICHUMILE GoADA, ET AL., THE ROLE OF RESOURCES IN AFRICA'S FUTURE: TOWARDS
A VISION FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF AFRICA'S NATURAL RESOURCES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.
saiia.org.za/images/stories/research/garp/rpt-seminaruganda-garn 13_march_2012.pdf.13.
14. Id. at 1-2.
15. For full information on the purpose and structure of the EITI, see Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, http://eiti.org/. See also Eddie Rich & T. Negbalee Warner, Addressing
the Roots of Liberia's Conflict Through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 42
ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10529, 10529 (2012) ("The Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI) sets a global standard for transparency in the management of oil, gas,
and mining revenues. In many resource-rich countries, especially those that are recovering from
civil war, opacity and silence have created mistrust and suspicion. Citizens often assume that the
government and the extractive companies are in cahoots to keep the wealth for themselves, and
companies sometimes feel that governments and citizens are ganging up on them to reset the
rules and renegotiate contracts. The EITI has been held up as a shining example of how multi-
stakeholder initiatives can address these kinds of challenges. But the initiative is still young, and
much of this praise has been premature."). For a general critique of transparency as a tool for
addressing natural resource mismanagement and promoting development, see Alexander Gillies
& Antoine Heuty, Does Transparency Work? The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness
in Resource-Rich Countries, 6 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 25, 26 (2011) ("Despite the widespread sup-
port for transparency and advances made in numerous resource-rich countries, assessments sug-
gest that these gains have not triggered major economic or developmental transformations or
any significant reductions in corruption.").
16. Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Commu-
nity Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 83 (2008).
Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Con-
sent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE Hum. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 83 (2008).
2013] 113
3
Duruigbo: Community Equity Participation in African Petroleum Ventures: Pat
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013
114 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:111
isting or proposed policy options tend to focus on national or collec-
tive objectives, as opposed to individual needs and aspirations.17 As
one commentator has noted, "[t]hese efforts meet some needs of oil-
producing African nations but do not address the needs of the people
within these countries at a micro-level."' 8 The immediate needs of the
individuals in African petroleum-producing countries need to be
taken into account beyond infrastructure provision, anti-corruption
campaigns, or general nation-building efforts." Strengthening the ec-
onomic and political position of the individual citizen ultimately fos-
ters national stability and development. 2 0  Equity participation
provides a framework for accomplishing these goals and addressing
some of the inadequacies of alternative mechanisms.
Accordingly, this article proposes that indigenes of communities
hosting oil and gas production should be afforded some economic
rights and investment opportunities through a system of equity partici-
pation in exploration and production ventures. Communities would
be integrated into joint ventures with energy companies and national
governments. A joint venture is a business arrangement in which indi-
viduals and entities pool resources and efforts to create a product or
provide some service and share in the risk and reward of their enter-
prise. Joint ventures have some features that are suitable for the goals
advanced here. They often have a limited purpose, a single undertak-
ing, a relatively short duration, and are ad hoc in nature.21 Tradition-
ally, joint ventures in the African oil and gas industry have been
entered into between energy companies and national governments
that act through state-owned oil corporations.2 2 Under the present
proposal, the traditional approach will be replaced by a tripartite joint
venture approach involving the government, energy companies, and
17. For an example of a proposal that targets individuals and their needs, see Todd Moss,
Oil-to-Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse Through Cash Transfers, 6 YALE J. INT'L Ave. 43
(2011) (proposing that countries seeking to manage new resource wealth engaging in direct dis-
tribution of oil income to the citizens in the form of cash transfers).
18. Aiken, supra note 11, at 295.
19. Id. (proposing "using simple technologies to provide individuals access to energy with-
out having to create a complete energy grid in each country.").
20. Id. at 294-95.
21. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures § 1 (2006) ("Although no exact definition can be given of
a joint venture, and the answer in each case depends upon the terms of the agreement, the acts
of the parties, the nature of the undertaking, and other facts,[FN1] nevertheless, a joint venture
has been generally defined as an association of two or more persons formed to carry out a single
business enterprise for profit[FN2] for which purpose they combine their property, money, ef-
fects, skill, and knowledge.") (citations omitted).
22. Mirian Kene Omalu, Developments in Petroleum Exploration and Production Arrange-
ments in Nigeria, 14 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REV. 70, 70-71 (1996).
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an entity representing community members. This entity may be a
community-owned corporation ("COC"). 23
Petroleum legislation in African oil and gas producing countries, in-
cluding emerging producers and their experienced counterparts grap-
pling with the pitfalls of petroleum development, should aim for the
institutionalization of these types of joint ventures backed by the ap-
propriate legal form.24 Pending such legislation, or in its absence, new
entrants into the African oil and gas sector, notably Chinese and In-
dian companies, should consider offering that option to potential host
communities as part of their license application. If this model takes
root and is seen as successful, it will be replicated, obviating the need
for legislation or spurring laws to formalize it.
This article is organized into six parts. Part I examines the strengths
and weaknesses of certain innovative energy policy models recently
implemented in Africa. These models are the Chad-Cameroon Pipe-
line Project's Revenue Management Plan designed by the World Bank
and the Chinese infrastructure development and financing approach
that is in play in such places as Angola, Congo, and Nigeria. Part II, in
view of the limitations of existing and proposed energy policy ap-
proaches, introduces the notion of equity participation. This part dis-
cusses successful equity participation models, namely the Texas
Relinquishment Act regime and the participation of South Africa's
Bafokeng Nation in the production of platinum in its territory. Part
III outlines a structure for implementing equity participation in host
communities and suggests the creation of separate and special purpose
vehicles that involves government agencies, energy companies, and
community corporations. Part IV makes the case for community eq-
uity participation as a necessary and significant component of an ef-
fective policy strategy. The benefits of community equity
participation, including the generation of social capital, facilitation of
corporate social license, and entrenchment of a closer and accounta-
ble form of governance are closely examined. Part V considers poten-
tial objections to the proposal, including financing issues and the
danger of disproportionate development. Part VI is the conclusion.
I. INNOVATIVE ENERGY POLICY MODELS IN AFRICA
As a result of dissatisfaction and disenchantment with the existing
approaches to managing Africa's rich natural resources, branding Af-
23. See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-
Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (2006).
24. See infra, Part Ill.
2013] 115
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rica as an exemplar of the resource curse,25 new approaches have been
introduced or proposed. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project was
one of such experiments.2 6 However, it has now been abandoned,
leaving a trail of failures. The Chinese investment model is still being
implemented in conjunction with the traditional State-centered
approach.
A. Shared Sovereignty Arrangement between Chad and the World
Bank
In the 1970's, a consortium of oil corporations, consisting of Chev-
ron, Conoco, Exxon, and Royal Dutch/Shell, discovered oil in Chad.
However, years of war and civil conflicts hindered further develop-
ment of the sizeable petroleum reserves and in 1979, oil development
was suspended. 2 7 After more than a decade, a reorganized consor-
tium reactivated interest in Chad's oil. The consortium was re-shaped
with the following members and their respective interests: Exxon
(40%); Malaysia's Petroleum Nasional Berhad ("Petronas") (35%);
and Chevron (25%).28
At its commencement, the $3.7 billion Chad-Cameroon pipeline
project was the biggest private sector investment in Africa.2 9 One and
one-half billion dollars was devoted to the extraction of oil from
Chad's Doba Basin while $2.2 billion was earmarked for the transpor-
tation aspect via a 670-mile (1,070 km) pipeline that passes through
Cameroon. Project partners formed an unincorporated joint venture
known as the Upstream Consortium to own and finance the explora-
tion component. The Chad portion of the pipeline was owned by
Tchad Oil Transportation Company ("TOTCO"). TOTCO is an in-
corporated joint venture between the Upstream Consortium and the
government of Chad. The Cameroon portion of the pipeline was
under the ownership of Cameroon Oil Transportation Company
("COTCO"), an entity incorporated as a joint venture between the
governments of Chad and Cameroon and the Upstream Consortium.30
25. The resource curse is a phenomenon that exposes the inverse relationship between en-
dowment with natural resources and social, political and economic development. See Paul Col-
lier, Laws and Codes for the Resource Curse, 11 YALE Hum. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 9, 11 (2008);
RICHARD M. Aury, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE
CURSE THESIS 1-7 (1993).
26. Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Dev. & Pipeline Project: Overview, WORLD BANK (Dec.
2006), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/09/
19/000020953_20070919092837/Rendered/PDF/36569.pdf.
27. Benjamin C. Esty, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project
(A), Harvard Business School Case Study (Jan. 16, 2003), 1.
28. Id. at 1-2.
29. See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Re-
source Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1, 39 (2005).
30. Id.
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As far as oil and gas projects are concerned, the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline project was clearly an innovation.3 ' The involvement of the
host government, a preeminent development and international finan-
cial institution and a number of leading multinational energy corpora-
tions may not sound innovative, but the objective behind the
collaboration and the level of involvement mark it out. The govern-
ment of Chad and the World Bank ("Bank") agreed to a plan that
carved out an unprecedented role for the Bank to manage the revenue
accruing from petroleum development. 3 2 Two major factors were be-
hind the Bank's decision to participate in the project. One factor was
that the leader of the consortium, Exxon Mobil, seeking to get valua-
ble political cover, insisted on the Bank's involvement as a condition
for proceeding with the investment.3 3 The Bank was also persuaded
to participate due to its belief that the project could be an engine for
poverty alleviation - an important goal of the World Bank.34 Accord-
ing to then President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, "the pro-
ject provides the best and perhaps only opportunity for Chad to
reduce the severe poverty of most of its population." 3 5 To ensure that
this objective was accomplished, the Bank conditioned its participa-
tion on the development of a revenue management plan that would
allocate a significant amount of the project's proceeds to socio-eco-
nomic development, particularly the alleviation of poverty and invest-
ment in the critical sectors of health and education. The Bank was
determined to counter the poor development experience of earlier oil
producers.
The Revenue Management Plan ("RMP") specified how oil reve-
nues would be allocated and distributed. The government was given a
very broad discretion on the expenditure of petroleum tax revenues.
However, in relation to the direct revenues from the project, flowing
from royalties and dividends, the government's discretion was se-
verely curtailed. The RMP provided that 10% of the direct revenues
would be kept or held by the World Bank in a fund for future genera-
tions, and the rest would be deposited in a Special Revenue Account
31. See LORENZO COTULA, HUMAN RIGHTS, NATURAL RESOURCE AND INVESTMENT LAW
IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: SHADES OF GREY IN THE SHADOW 01 THE LAW 106 (2012).
32. Peter Rosenblum, Pipeline Politics in Chad, 99 CURRENT HIST., 195, 199 (2000).
33. Korinna Horta, Public-Private Partnership and Institutional Capture: The State, Interna-
tional Institutions, and Indigenous Peoples in Chad and Cameroon, in THE PoITICS OF RE-
SOURCE EXTRACTION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE STATE
204, 209 (Suzana Sawyer & Edmund T. Gomez eds., 2012). Exxon Mobil's insistence was based
on the belief that the participation of the World Bank would provide the company with the
needed cushion from political risk and insulation from critical non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
34. Esty, supra note 27, at 6.
35. Id. (citing Letter from James D. Wolfensohn to Honorable James P. McGovern, The
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515, June 28, 1999).
2013] 117
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and distributed. Eighty percent would be dedicated to financing pro-
grams in five important sectors: education; health and social services;
rural development; infrastructure; and environment and water re-
sources. The government would keep 15% in its coffers to be spent
on recurrent expenditure and outside any oversight. The remaining
5% would be devoted to the development of the oil-producing Doba
region.3 6
The RMP went beyond revenue allocation and distribution to incor-
porate layers of oversight. A nine-member oversight committee,
known as the Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee,
was instituted to review the annual expenditure approved by the Bank
and the government of Chad. The Committee's membership was
drawn from the government and civil society and, members would be
appointed for terms of three to five years. The Committee had a
mandate to publish an annual review of the operations that were sub-
ject to external audit. The RMP was a binding instrument because the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
European Investment Bank (EIB) tied the government's performance
under the RMP to future lending by the World Bank. The World
Bank also instituted an International Advisory Group (IAG) com-
posed of eminent persons and designed to last for ten years.3 7  How-
ever, the IAG only had an advisory role and its functions were limited.
Though instituted separately from, and prior to, the Chad-Came-
roon pipeline project, the World Bank Inspection Panel represented
an additional level of oversight for the project.38 The Inspection Panel
was established in 1993 by the Board of Executive Directors of the
Bank to serve as an independent mechanism that would ensure that
the Bank's operations were in consonance with its policies and proce-
dures.39 The primary objective behind the creation of the Panel was
36. Republic of Chad, Law No. 001/PR/99 (Jan. 11, 1999), translated in IAN GARY & NIKKI
REISCH, CATHOLIC RELIEF SLRVs. & BANK INFO. CTR. CHAD'S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?:
FOLLOWING THE MONEY IN AFRICA'S NEWEST PETRO-STATE 98 (2005); Edmund Sanders, Oil
Promise Still a Dream, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 9, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/09/business/
fi-chadoil9.
37. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Appoints International Advisory Group on the
Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Feb. 21, 2001) available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/
0,,contentMDK:20014994-menuPK:64282138-pagePK:41367-piPK:279616-theSitePK:349862,
00.html.
38. See Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil
Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
77, 120 (2002) (describing a report issued by the panel).
39. See World Bank Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building
Project (Credit No. 3373-CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-
CD) at ii, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/
ChadInvestigationReporFinal.pdf.
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to provide an opportunity for groups of citizens to present their con-
cerns regarding Bank-financed activities that were considered harmful
to them or their interests.4 0 In 2001, while acting upon a request for
inspection, the Panel undertook an inspection of the project and is-
sued a report. The report called for reinforced monitoring of the pro-
ject by the Bank to ensure the protection of human rights.4 1
In December 1999, the government of Chad passed a law incorpo-
rating the principal elements of the RMP, including procedures for
audit and provisions relating to the establishment of an oversight com-
mittee. In 2003, Chad started selling oil.43 In November 2003, the
sum of $6.5 million in receipts from the first sale of crude oil was de-
posited into the account and in December 2003, the government ap-
proved its first budget, including oil revenue, and submitted it to the
RMP for approval.44
In October 2005, capitalizing on rising oil prices, the government of
Chad announced that it was abandoning some of its commitments
under the RMP and sought a review of the revenue management
law.4 5 Under a law signed by the president in January 2006, the gov-
ernment re-defined priority areas to include national security, in addi-
tion to health and education, to enable the government to beef up its
military arsenal with a view to repelling rebel uprising in the eastern
provinces bordering the already violence-prone Darfur region of Su-
dan.4 6 The government also stated that it was abolishing the future
generations' fund.4 7 A disappointed World Bank was not favorably
disposed to the changes, warning the government of Chad that it
would view its reneging on the agreement as a breach of the loan
agreement.'
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Stephen v. Arbogast, Project Financing & Political Risk Mitigation: The Singular
Case of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 282-85 (2008-2009).
43. See Emily Wax, Oil Wealth Trickles Into Chad, but Little Trickles Down Five Months
After Opening of Pipeline to Cameroon, Locals Await Benefits and Crime Rate Rises, Wash. Post,
Mar. 13, 2004, A16 (reporting on the first few months of oil sales); See also United Nations
Department of Public Information, Oil Pipeline Opens for Business, 17 Africa Recovery 24 (Oct.
2003) (describing the fiscal aspects of the oil pipeline).
44. Id. at A16.
45. Lydia Polgreen, Chad Backs Out of Pledge to Use Oil Wealth to Reduce Poverty, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at A15.
46. Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Reaches Pact with Chad over Use of Oil Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 15, 2006, at A8.
47. Paul Blustein, Chad Pipeline Project Steeped in Controversy: World Bank Reconsiders
Role as Nation looks at Altering Terms, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.chron.com/
business/energy/article/Chad-pipeline-project-steeped-in-controversy-1569643.php.
48. Paul Blustein, Chad's Hard-Line Stance Tests World Bank, LATIN AM. HERALD
TRIB.,POsT, Dec. 27, 2005, http://laht.com/article.asp?Categoryld=12395&Articleld=214701. See
generally, Chip Cummins, Exxon Oil Fund Model Unravels in Chad, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2006,
at A4; DAVID VOGEL, THE PRIVATE REGULATION OF GLOBAL CORPORATE CONDucr 34-35
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In January 2006, because of Chad's breach of the agreement, the
World Bank blocked its access to royalty payments and suspended
$124 million in loans.49 With threats by the government of Chad to
close oil wells if the hold on the accounts was not lifted, the Bank
reached an interim deal with the government in April 2006.50 Under
the deal, the Bank agreed to resume loan disbursements and release
more than $100 million in overdue royalties to the Chadian govern-
ment.51 The Bank also yielded to the government's request to double
the percentage of money it could spend without constraints.5 2 In-
creasing the government's discretionary allocation by more than
100% also meant a drastic reduction of the poverty alleviation alloca-
tion. In addition, the government wanted to spend some part of the
reduced poverty reduction money on security.54
In July 2006, the Bank and the government of Chad reached a one-
year deal, covering only 2007 revenues, which maintained the increase
in discretionary revenues to the government and allotted 70% of all
revenues from the project to poverty reduction.55 The Bank's lever-
age was also somewhat strengthened. Unlike the previous arrange-
ment under the RMP that did not include indirect revenues (namely
taxes and custom duties), the July 2007 agreement included them, al-
lowing the Bank to exercise oversight over both direct and indirect
revenues.5 1 Considering that indirect revenues were expected to re-
present a substantial portion of government revenues in the years
ahead, this inclusion appeared to be significant. Additionally, the
government agreed to undertake an audit of the special petroleum
revenue accounts in 2006 and cooperate with the World Bank and
other stakeholders in strengthening the role of the Monitoring Com-
(UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, MUNK CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WORKING PAPER
No. V (2006) , available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/documents/
10.03%20VogeI%20globalgov%20NW.pdf.
49. David White, World Bank in Deal with Chad, FIN. TIMES EUROPE, Apr. 28, 2006, http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dcff02lc-d652-1lda-8b3a-0000779e2340.html#axzz2OIPZZ6vW.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD BANK (Mar.
2007), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:
20263700-menuPK:534320-pagePK:98400-piPK:98424-theSitePK:95474,00.html.
56. Cathy Landry, Chad Deal to Raise World Bank Influence: New Oil Production Accord
Brings Clearer Revenue Framework, 84 PLATrs OILGRAM NEWS 5, July 17, 2006; see John A.
Gould & Matthew Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Explaining Shifts in Leverage be-
tween the Government and the World Bank, 9 BUSINESS & POLITICS, 2007, at 2, http://www.
bepress.com/bap/vol9/iss2/art4.
57. Landry, supra note 56, at 5.
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mittee.58 The Doba region would continue to receive an allocation of
5% for local projects while revenues in excess of projections will be
placed in a reserve stabilization fund for use in the future.5 9 The
agreement rejected the government's re-definition of the priority list
to include security but included the government's addition of 'justice'
to the list.6 0 The July agreement built on the April interim deal and
was designed to form the foundation for a more permanent agreement
that would cover revenues in future years. 1 Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the constraints on the RMP implementation did not abate
considerably, prompting the World Bank to withdraw from the project
in 2008.62 An unperturbed Chadian government, buoyed by huge oil
revenues and acting on feelers from the World Bank, paid off its loans
to the Bank, ending what was left of the relationship.63
The Chad experiment did not live up to the high hopes that greeted
its emergence. Among observers intimately familiar with the project,
it is generally considered a failure. 64 Some of the reasons for the fail-
ure are structural. For instance, the Monitoring Committee was weak,
by design, and the scope of its assignment was not a model of clarity.
The Committee had a mandate to "verify," "authorize" and "oversee"
expenditure of revenues, but the exact parameters of this mandate
were unclear.6 5 For example, there was a lack of clarity as to whether
its monitoring function was limited to expenditure only or included
revenue collection, management, and expenditure.6 6 Critics noted
early on in the process that the Monitoring Committee should be in-
vested with subpoena powers to strengthen it and enhance its work.67
The process of removing Monitoring Committee members was easy,
creating an avenue to conveniently remove even competent members
who fall out of favor with the government.68 A stronger arrangement
would have likely provided for the sharing of the powers of appoint-
ment and removal of Committee members between the government
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Annalisa M. Leibold, Aligning Incentives for Development: The World Bank and the
Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (2011) (stating that on September 9,
2008, the World Bank announced that it was withdrawing from the project).
63. Id. at 168 (stating that the World Bank required the loan repayment as part of its with-
drawal terms).
64. See Sharp, supra note 12, at 380.
65. IAN GARY & TERRY LYNN KARL, Bo-rrOM OF THE BARREL: AFRICA's OIL BOOM AND
THE POOR 70 (Catholic Relief Services 2003).
66. Id.
67. Luc Lampriere et al., Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies and Institu-
tional Weaknesses, (Oct. 13, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School
Human Rights Clinical Program).
68. See Gary and Karl, supra note 65, at 72.
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and the external institution. Indeed, one commentator had predicted
imminent failure of the project because of this imbalance of power,
arguing that a necessary ingredient for success would be to provide for
the appointment of members of the governing or supervisory board by
an international organization. 69 Obviously, the government of Chad
would have adamantly resisted efforts to further erode its powers, and
the Bank was content to get any deal that was politically feasible.
Another major contributor to the failure of the experiment, apart
from structural problems, is the absence of political will. The govern-
ment of Chad lacked the political will to follow through with even the
modest obligations that it agreed to undertake.7 0 Again, this outcome
could not have come as a complete surprise to those skeptics who har-
bour the belief that many unaccountable governments, such as the
type in Chad, should not be counted upon to live up to their bargain
and that institution-building should precede natural resource
development."
Nevertheless, one should not be in a haste to figuratively throw out
the proverbial "baby with the bathwater." The idea behind the Chad
experiment was a noble one, with a determination on the part of the
World Bank to reverse the ugly trajectory of resource abundance fail-
ing to benefit the majority of the citizens, as has been seen in a num-
ber of countries in Africa and elsewhere. While it did not achieve its
loftier goals, a level of success was recorded.7 2 Instead of discarding
such collaborative, people-centered arrangements, we should continue
to explore ways to make them better. For instance, a more robust
role for host communities should be incorporated into the arrange-
ment instead of a top-down approach that relies on national leaders to
propose and execute local projects.7 4
69. James C. Owens, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The International Commu-
nity's Options, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1047-49 (2003).
70. Lampriere, et al, supra note 67, at 2, 5 (noting that success of the program depends on
political will).
71. See generally Gary & Karl, supra note 65, at 68.
72. INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., THE WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM OF SUPPORT FOR THE
CHAD-CAMIROON PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION, Report No.
50315 (2009) at 43, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOED/Resources/ChadCamReport.pdf
. ("If [oil was developed without World Bank involvement], the environmental and social provi-
sions and the external monitoring arrangements would not have been as thorough as those under
the program. Also, it is probable that the revenue allocations to the "priority sectors' would have
been lower, and virtually certain that the support institutions such as the College and the advi-
sory group would not have been put in place.").
73. See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Nunc Dimittis or Chief Cornerstone?: Evaluating Af-
rica's International Norm-Development Experiment in the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project,
Presentation at Albany Law School's Africa and International Law Conference, Albany, New
York (Apr. 14, 2012).
74. See Stefaan Smis & Stephen S. Kingah, How the Government of Chad Can Meet Devel-
opment Pledges to its People Without Breaching its Obligations with the World Bank and Mul-
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B. Chinese Investment Model
The Chinese investment approach, in Africa's natural resource sec-
tor, links oil and gas licensing to a corresponding investment in do-
mestic infrastructure.75  This investment could take the form of
railroads, airports, refineries, educational institutions, and health facil-
ities. China's primary objective in adopting this approach is to secure
the goodwill of African political leaders and make inroads into the
African natural resources' industries.7 6 Obviously, China realizes that
it is a late entrant into an area in which rival interests are already well
entrenched. Resorting to this method helps in creating a more condu-
cive playing field, even if it does not succeed in levelling it. The Chi-
nese approach of resource-backed infrastructure financing is not
entirely unprecedented or unique.7 7  Nevertheless, the Chinese ap-
proach is innovative in the sense that it represents a sharp departure
from the approach of Western countries whose multinational corpora-
tions have, over the course of several decades, been at the forefront of
Africa's oil development.7 1 Professor Chris Okeke remarks that a sa-
lient point of divergence between the Chinese entrance into Africa
and that of the United States and western European countries "is that
China did not view itself as superior but rather as a partner."7 9 Okeke
continues: "Accordingly, China has successfully launched corporate
partnerships with African governments. It has also promoted signifi-
cant direct foreign investments."s 0 Another scholar describes the Chi-
nese approach and its distinguishing quality in the following words:
tinational Oil Companies, 4 MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2007); Macartan Humphreys,
Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, 49 J. CONF.
RES. 508, 512 & n. 13 (2005) (discussing skepticism of local chiefs in the Doba oil-producing
region of Chad about oil revenues being actually spent in their region, despite formal provisions
to that effect in the revenue management plan, and their resulting petition to oil corporations for
direct compensation).
75. See Alexis Habiyaremye, CHINAFRIQUE, AFRICOM, and African Natural Re-
sources: A Modern Scramble for Africa?, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIP. & INT. REL. 79 (2011).
76. See Aiken, supra note 11, at 319; Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation
for Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT'i L. 1, 34
(2007) (discussing China's effort at forging relationships with African leaders with a view to
gaining access to some of the continent's natural resources).
77. See Suzanne Siu, The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Minerals for Infrastructure
Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 599, 616
(2010).
78. Aiken, supra note 11, at 319 (stating that the United States and other Western countries
have not had a significant involvement in infrastructural development as part of petroleum in-
vestment in African countries); See Siu, supra note 77, at 616-17 (arguing that "China's particu-
larly effective use of resources for infrastructure financing, combined together with its
multilateral engagement of recipient states, differentiates the Chinese approach from other
forms of sovereign and commercial financing").
79. Okeke, supra note 12, at 198.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
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The Chinese strategy of swapping large infrastructure projects for ac-
cess to mineral resources also created a completely new feature in the
resource market. By building much needed infrastructure in Africa,
China has the advantage of acquiring African resources in exchange
for undertaking development projects on African soil instead of send-
ing oil revenues to foreign bank accounts.
Some of these projects include the financing of huge infrastructure
projects in Angola, in exchange for the country's oil, including the
building of 215,000 housing units, restoration of 1,000 miles of high-
way and 1,665 miles of railroad, and the construction of a new interna-
tional airport in the capital city of Luanda.8 2 War-ravaged Angola also
accelerated its reconstruction activities through three oil-backed loans
from Beijing that commissioned Chinese companies to build roads,
railways, hospitals, schools, and water systems.8 3 Similar loan ar-
rangements were undertaken with Nigeria to finance projects that use
gas to generate electricity.84 The China State Construction Engineer-
ing Company signed an agreement with the Nigerian National Petro-
leum Corporation in May 2006 to invest $23 billion toward the
construction of oil refineries and a petrochemical plant in Nigeria."
Teams from China are also building a hydropower project in the Re-
public of Congo, to be repaid in oil, while a similar project to be re-
paid in cocoa beans was embarked upon in Ghana.
The core advantage of the Chinese approach is that it assures infras-
tructural development at a faster pace than would ordinarily be the
case if left to national, state, or local governments in Africa." An-
other advantage is that it provides the resource-owning countries with
additional leverage in negotiations with Western oil companies, lead-
ing to appreciably higher bids for oil and gas licenses." By raising the
bar, the Chinese investors weaken the resistance of Western investors
considerably and deprive them of one more excuse for underpricing
the assets.
A major problem with the Chinese approach is that it could be
mired in corruption. Some instances of corrupt activities that have
already surfaced include cases in Congo-Brazzaville where the coun-
81. Habiyaremye, supra note 75, at 89.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Because of corruption and related factors, public infrastructure projects are often left
uncompleted or take considerable time to complete by the firms that won the contract.
88. Bashir Adigun, China Offers Nigeria $1.1B Loan for Rail, Airports, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sep. 12, 2012), www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10435206.
89. See PAdraig Carmody, The Scramble for Biofuels and Timber in Africa, 12 WHITEHEAD
J. Dw. & INT'L REL. 125, 131 (2011).
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try's minister of forestry and environment is a major shareholder in a
Chinese timber company operating there and the construction of a
large house by the Chinese for a senior government official that man-
ages large infrastructure projects in the country."o Considering that
corruption is a major impediment to Africa's economic and political
development, this concern cannot be glossed over.91
Critics note that Chinese investors would leave host African coun-
tries worse off because they do not make real contributions to the
local economy. The Chinese are known to import workers and food
items from China instead of using local talent and products. 9 2 China's
lack of interest in internal political development in the importing
countries or reckless disregard of human rights abuses in such places
raises strong concerns.93 By ignoring the misdeeds of these rulers and
while providing them with alternative source of financing, China
weakens efforts to hold the leaders accountable. 94 Ultimately, the cit-
izens bear the brunt of the misrule and lack of needed political re-
forms while China profits in the form of access to desperately needed
90. Id.
91. See GLOBAL WITNESS, RIGGED? THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S OIL, GAS AND MINR-
ALS 2 (2012), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/RIGGED%20
The%20Scramble%20for%20Africa%27s%20oil,%20gas%20and%20minerals%20.pdf (stating
that "corruption can prop up autocratic governments that keep their people in poverty while
enriching elites and the international companies that are willing to do business with them.").
92. See e.g., Ruth Gordon, The Environmental Implications of China's Engagement With
Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 ENvTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11112 n. 38 (2012) ("It has
been estimated that there are more than 700 Chinese enterprises in more than 50 countries,
employing close to 80,000 Chinese workers in a broad variety of sectors, including light manufac-
turing, services, agroprocessing, apparel, and telecommunications. Africa has also been on the
receiving end of, inter alia, low-cost Chinese motorcycles, electronic goods, and tee shirts.");
James Kraska, LO. 2.0: Indian Ocean Security and the Law of the Sea, 43 GEo. J. INT'L L. 433,
440 (2012) ("While China has long burnished its Third World solidarity with post-colonial re-
gimes in Africa, the brashness of the new economic relationship between Africa and China can
be grating to Africans. Anxious to deliver jobs to its population, China has exported 750,000 of
its rural poor to Africa. Migrant Chinese workers have been brought to the continent, taking
positions that otherwise would employ local workers.") (citations omitted); Peter K. Yu, Sinic
Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 953, 1015 n. 285 and accompanying text (2011); David
Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65, 78 (2011)
("Understandably, many Africans are wary of Chinese migrant labor, particularly as Chinese
infrastructural loans require hiring a certain percentage of Chinese workers. Yet, given the rela-
tively small number of Chinese laborers in Africa, their overall impact on African employment
should not be exaggerated. Chinese-supported construction and manufacturing ventures also
create jobs for Africans, which likely otherwise would not be available.").
93. See Alan o. Sykes, Corporate Liability For Extraterritorial Torts Under The Alien Tort
Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2195-96 (2012) (discussing
China's benefiting from the exit from Sudan of the Canadian energy company, Talisman, as a
response to human rights allegations and litigation in the U.S. that the company eventually won).
94. Russell P. McAleavey, Pressuring Sudan: The Prospect of an Oil-for-Food Program for
Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1058, 1069 n.50 (2008) (referencing "increasing U.S. frustration
with China's willingness to do business in countries United States is trying to pressure or isolate,
such as Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe."); Patrick J. Keenan, Financial Globalization
and Human Rights, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 509, 545 (2008).
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oil." Any meaningful energy policy in African countries should incor-
porate the Chinese approach of infrastructural development while dis-
carding the unpalatable and problematic aspects.9 6 The infrastructure
development need not be structured as resource-backed financing. It
may take the shape of preconditions for the grant of prospecting or
production licenses97 or as bonus payments that are due to the mineral
owner (host country) regardless of whether oil and gas are produced
by the energy company.98
The policy approaches discussed above, like many of the imple-
mented or proposed policy options for Africa, are hobbled by an addi-
tional, significant impediment - the emphasis on national or collective
good. Emphasizing national interest is not inherently bad because the
individuals that make up the nation-state would ultimately benefit
from it. However, national interest should not be at the expense of
individual benefit, especially when such individual benefit is not inimi-
cal to the general welfare. Equity participation provides a link to meet
individual needs and simultaneously contribute to national develop-
ment in a manner that many of these other options do not.99 The next
part discusses this approach.
95. Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned
Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 100 (2009) ("In the end, China's willingness to fund the
Angolan government without the kinds of transparency or accountability conditions that other
international lenders would require is in China's strategic interest because China is able to en-
sure access to oil for which it is desperate. The cost, however, is borne by the people of Angola.
China's assistance permitted the Angolan government to forego IMF assistance, which may have
contributed to the development of useful governance norms and created an incentive for the
Angolan government to change its behavior.").
96. Uche Ewelukwa, Trade, Empires and Subjects: China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade
Arrangement or the Third Scramble For Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 511 (2008)
("While there is much that Africa could gain from the relationship, African leaders and their
constituents must guard against imperialism of any sort and shy away from arrangements that
threaten sustainable development on the continent or undermine respect for human rights and
dignity. Most importantly, African leaders must push past Beijing's rhetoric of anti-hegemonism
and develop clear policies to guide the continent's engagement with China.").
97. See GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 91, at 23.
98. See JOHN S. LoWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHFLL 41 (5th ed. 2009) (defining an oil
and gas bonus as "the right to any payments made to induce the signing of the lease").
99. It is true that there are other proposed options, such as a "People's Fund" and revenue
distribution arrangements that have a similar goal, while being immune from the criticism about
a lack of individual focus. However, they differ from equity participation in a significant respect.
They propose the replacement of the current revenue model in oil-producing countries by dis-
tributing oil revenues directly to the people, instead of retaining them in national coffers and
utilizing them for national programs. Regardless of the merit of such an idea, they are likely to
be rejected outright by the political elites currently profiting from the status quo. Equity partici-
pation, on the other hand, does not seek to replace national revenues in that manner.
16
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11. THE EQUITY PARTICIPATION OPTION
A. Conceptual Issues
Equity participation is deployed in diverse contexts, such as real es-
tate financing and business investment. 00 It denotes the notion or
practice of holding an ownership stake in an asset, business, or pro-
ject. In energy infrastructure projects, it means that the equity partici-
pant is a partial owner in the venture. This partial ownership interest
entitles the participant to participate in project decision-making and
share in gains and losses flowing from the project. Obviously, the idea
of equity participation is linked to the issue of ownership. In most
parts of the world, ownership of oil and gas resources is vested in the
government.101 With the exception of Canada, the United States, and
some old Spanish land grants in Colombia, individuals have no right
to petroleum resources underneath their land.1 02 A system of public
ownership is premised on the belief that the government will utilize
the state-owned resources for the common good. 03 Sadly, this belief
has not proven true in many countries, particularly in Africa, as a
small but powerful segment of the population pockets to itself the
benefits of the people's patrimony. 104
100. See e.g., J. Cary Barton & Robert E. Morrison, Equity Participation Arrangements Be-
tween Institutional Lenders and Real Estate Developers, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1981).
101. See Michele Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural Resources:
Practice and Policy, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS
DivISION, STAFF WORKING PAPER ERSD-2012-07 (March 2012), at 1, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/res e/reser e/ersd2Ol2O7-e.pdf ("Subsoil assets are typically state-owned. . . .");
Hurst Groves, Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Economics, Politics and the Rule of Law in the
Nigeria-Sdo Tomd 9 Principe Joint Development Zone, 59 J. INT'L AFF. 81, 83 (2005) (referencing
"the nearly universal principle that oil ... [is] the property of the state .... ).
102. David Johnston, How to Evaluate the Fiscal Terms of Oil Contracts, in ESCAPING THE
RESOURCE CURSE 53, 68 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds.,
2007) ("With the exception of the United States, Canada, and a very few old Spanish land grants
in Colombia, mineral rights belong to the state."); Kenneth S. Culotta, Recipe for a Tex-Mex
Pipeline Project: Considerations in Permitting a Cross-Border Gas Transportation Project, 39
TEX. INT'L L.J. 287, 306 (2004) (stating that "most oil and gas legal contracting regimes are based
on state ownership of the resource in situ."); Jeffrey D. Sachs, How to Handle the
Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth, in Escaping the Resource Curse, supra note 92, at 172, 180 (stat-
ing that "public ownership of hydrocarbon reserves is the norm"); Uisdean R. Vass & Adriana
Lezcano, The New Venezuelan Legal Regime for Natural Gas: A Hopeful New Beginning?, 36
TEX. INT'L L.J. 99, 105 (2001) ("Outside the onshore United States, it is practically universal that
governments own the rights to hydrocarbons in place in the reservoir . . "). In reality, the
system is one of public-private ownership in which both the government and individuals own
natural resources. For instance, state and federal governments in the U.S. and Canada own oil
and gas found on public lands. Thus, there is really no pure system of private ownership, where
only private citizens own oil and gas in situ, a direct counterpart to exclusive ownership by the
government prevalent in most of the world.
103. John Southalan, What are the Implications of Human Rights for Minerals Taxation?, 36
RES. POL. 214, 214-226 (2011); Groves, supra note 101.
104. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous
Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45 (1995).
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As a result, there have been calls for the adoption of the alternative
system that allows for private ownership.o 5 It is likely that such calls
will continue to meet with resistance and rejection by the politically-
connected forces that benefit from the status quo. An equity partici-
pation approach represents a viable and politically-palatable middle
course capable of bridging the gap between the competing systems of
public and private ownership. Under equity participation, the govern-
ment will continue to retain ownership of natural resources, but host
communities and other surface owners will be allowed to participate
in the available structures for exploiting the minerals. Such a system
has been in place in Texas for almost a century under the Texas Relin-
quishment Act. 10 6
B. Equity Participation in Texas
While the United States permits private ownership of oil and gas in
situ, without prejudice to government ownership of oil and gas on
public lands and territorial waters, there are variations on how each
state recognizes the right. 10 7 In states, like Texas and Arkansas that
subscribe to the "ownership-in-place" theory, a landowner owns the
oil and gas underneath his land.os In states like California and Wyo-
ming that have adopted the "non-ownership" theory, the landowner's
right is not construed as ownership; instead, she has an exclusive right
to explore and produce the oil and gas underlying her land.'0 How-
105. See Emeka Duruigbo, Realizing the People's Right to Natural Resources, 12 WHITE-
HEAD J. OF DIPL. & INT'L REL. 111 (2011).
106. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 52.171-52.189 (West 2011) (The Relinquishment Act of
1919 was repealed, but reenacted verbatim in 1977 as part of the Texas Natural Resources
Code).
107. See EUGENE KUNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 60-1 (1987). "In the
United States, private ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals has long been recognized. Own-
ership of land carries with it ownership of or the exclusive right to enjoy substances under the
surface, and the state has no proprietary rights by virtue of its status as sovereign. The sovereign
has only such proprietary rights as it might have reserved in the land upon patent or might have
subsequently acquired. To the extent that there is a notion that society generally should benefit
from the exploitation and depletion of natural resources, it is expressed by the imposition of
severance taxes and by constitutional or statutory provisions requiring the state to reserve cer-
tain mineral rights upon disposing of public lands." (citations omitted); CURTIS H. LINDLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL LANDS 43-44 (reprint ed.
1972).
108. Christopher Kulander, Big Money vs. Grand Designs: Revisiting the Executive Right to
Lease Oil & Gas Interests, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 73 (2009). Apart from Texas, other states
that follow the ownership-in-place theory include Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Mich-
igan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington
and West Virginia.
109. RICHARD C. MAXWELL, ET AL., OIL AND GAS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 23, 25 (8th ed.
2007); Theresa D. Poindexter, Comment, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture,
Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust, 268 S. W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755, 781 (2009). Apart from
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ever, regardless of the theory of ownership adopted, the landowner's
rights in the oil and gas deposits are modified by the rule of capture.o
Under the rule or law of capture, oil or gas belongs to the person that
captures or produces it, even if the captured mineral migrated from
the neighboring landowner's tract.' The Relinquishment Act re-
gime can be considered a third variant-a system of shared "owner-
ship" (or equity participation) between the State and the
landowner.11 2
The application of the Relinquishment Act is limited to lands set
aside by the State of Texas, for the support of public schools and asy-
lums, and sold with a mineral classification or reservation between
September 1, 1895 and June 29, 1931.113 Most of these lands are in
West Texas." 4 It also follows that any land originally sold within this
thirty-six-year period without a mineral reservation or classification is
not subject to the Relinquishment Act, thus leaving the landowners
with ownership of the oil and gas underneath their land.1 '
The Relinquishment Act, as presently applied, confers on a surface
owner the right to lease the minerals under his land as an agent of the
State. 116 In return, the surface owner receives one-half of the lease
benefits, including royalties, delay rentals, and bonuses, while the re-
maining half belongs to the State.11 7 The State's portion of the com-
California, other states that follow the nonownership or exclusive right-to-take theory include
Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma and Wyoming.
110. Essentially, the two systems lead to the same result. See John G. Sprankling, Owning
the Center of the Earth, UCLA L. REV. 979, 1009-10 (2008); JOHN S. LOWE, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 26 (5th ed. 2008) (stating that "the distinction in theories is
largely one of terminology.").
111. Christianson Hartman, Is the Wind Mine to Give Away? Guidance for Testators Wishing
to Transfer a Wind Interest, 1 EsT. PLAN. & COMM. PROP. L. J. 399, 410 (2009).
112. Patrick H. Martin, Royalty Issues on Lands Owned by State or Local Governments, 33B
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 5 (1993) (describing as unique, Texas' arrangement with regard to
certain of its public land under the Relinquishment Act).
113. Id.; see also Relinquishment Act Lease Brochure, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., (Oct. 2001),
103, http://www.glo.texas.gov/what-we-dolenergy-and-minerals/_documents/oil-gas/permitting-
leasing/relinquishment-act-leasing/HROW TractsGuidelines.pdf; Kirk J. Bily, Royalty on Take-
or-Pay Payments and Related Consideration Accruing to Producers, 27 Hous. L. REv. 105, 123
(1990); James D. Shields, Leasing Lands Subject to the Texas Relinquishment Act, 13 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 869, 869 (1982).
114. Patrick H. Martin, Royalty Issues on Lands Owned by State or Local Governments, 33B
RMMLF-INsT 5 (1993).
115. H. Philip (Flip) Whitworth, Leasing and Operating State-Owned Lands for Oil and Gas
Development, 16 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 673, 682 (1985) ("If land was originally sold by the state
during this 36-year period without a mineral reservation or classification, then the Relinquish-
ment Act does not apply and the state has no interest in the oil and gas which may underlie these
lands.").
116. Hartman, supra note 111, at 1021; J.W. Adams, Jr., Oil and Gas Leasing upon Texas
State Lands, 18 TEx. J. Bus. L. 20, 20 (1984).
117. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.172; see also Cross v. Shell Oil Co., 144 Tex. 78, 188
S.W.2d 375 (1945), conformed to 189 S.W.2d 216.
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pensation from an oil and gas lease must never fall below one-
sixteenth royalty or less than ten cents per acre as delay rental.11 s The
surface owner's financial participation is rationalized as compensation
for services rendered as an agent and for the damage caused by the
use of his or her surface for the production of the minerals.119 Some
commentators do not buy the rationale, viewing it as a "fiction" de-
signed and deployed to mask the real justification, which is that the
landowner is being given an interest in, and legally empowered to
share in the benefit of, the oil underneath her land.120
The landowner's power does not include the power to perpetually
alienate the mineral interest or convey a mineral fee since he does not
have legal title to the minerals consistent with the maxim nemo dat
quod non habet.1'2 The landowner is free to alienate the interests by
lease which ends after an ascertainable period of time or specified
event. Besides, the landowner is within his rights to assign any bene-
fits, e.g., royalties, under an existing lease to another person for the
duration of the lease.122 The statutory agency created under the Re-
linquishment Act is accompanied by a number of important duties.
One of such duties is a duty to commence drilling an offset well within
100 days of discovering that a non-Relinquishment Act land located
within 1,000 feet from the landowner's land is producing oil and gas in
commercial quantities. 123 This duty is aimed at the prevention of loss
of the State's oil and gas through drainage by adjoining or neighboring
lands that are not subject to the Relinquishment Act and over which
the State has no property interest. Failure of the landowner to drill a
well to prevent the drainage may lead to the landowner losing benefits
under any lease she might have entered into with respect to the
land. 124
The landowner's duty to lease Relinquishment Act land as the
state's agent is a fiduciary duty.125 As a fiduciary, the owner of the
118. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.172 (West 2011).
119. Stuart C. Hollimon, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 381, 406 (1989-1990).
120. See Holt v. Giles, 150 Tex. 351 (1951); Norman v. Giles, 148 Tex. 21, 26 (1949) ("Evi-
dently as a result of these considerations the Legislature found it desirable to connect the surface
owner more closely and less unprofitably with the development of the minerals and passed the
Relinquishment Act in order to accomplish this purpose through empowering the surface own-
ers to lease the oil and gas.").
121. State v. Magnolia Petrol. Co., 173 S.W.2d 186, 190 (1943).
122. Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502, 505 (1932).
123. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.171 (West 2011).
124. See EDWARD K. ESPING, 55A TEX. JUR. 3D OIL & GAS § 338 (West 2011) ("The Relin-
quishment Act contemplates a continuing and perpetual leasing agency in the surface owner
unless forfeited on the statutory ground of failure to drill offset wells, or perhaps on equitable
grounds such as fraud or failure or inability to act.") (citations omitted).
125. Patrick H. Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretation of the
Power to Lease and Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 390, 391 (1997).
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soil is obligated to act in the best interest of the state and must give
full disclosure of any facts affecting the state's interest. Where a con-
flict arises between the interests of the State and surface owner, the
owner is duty-bound to subordinate her interests to the State's inter-
ests. 1 2 6 Further, the landowner is prohibited from delegating her
agency powers under the Act to another individual although a corpo-
rate owner may act through an agent to execute the lease.12 7 The va-
lidity of any lease executed by the surface owner is conditioned upon
the approval of the General Land Office (GLO). Accordingly, the
landowner is under an obligation to file the lease with the GLO.128
C. Equity Participation in South Africa
A notable equity participation model in Africa is that involving the
Royal Bafokeng Nation in South Africa. The Royal Bafokeng Nation
holds shares of Implats which is the company developing the substan-
tial platinum reserves in the ethnic homeland.129  , The Royal
Bafokeng Nation, a community of approximately 150,000 Setswana
speaking people, holds and manages its commercial assets through
Royal Bafokeng Holdings (Pty) Limited (RBH) which is the commu-
nity's "primary investment vehicle." 3 0 RBH holds an aggregate stake
of 13.2% in Implats which translates to more than 83 million shares. 1 3 1
Implats is the second largest platinum producer in the world and its
flagship operation, Impala Platinum, mines land owned by the Royal
Bafokeng Nation. 13 2 Because Implats has operations in a number of
places, RBH's holdings in Implats give it exposure to more than just
the local operation run by Impala but also to other interests held by
Implats in other places in South Africa and in Zimbabwe.1 33 Of ad-
ded significance is the fact that RBH is the single largest shareholder
in Implats with an investment that also represents RBH's single larg-
est investment. 134 According to a recent newspaper report, "[t]he
126. Relinquishment Act Lease Brochure, supra note 113, at 1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Conrad Mugoya Bosire, A Dry Udder in the Milk Season? Natural Resource Exploita-
tion in Africa: Realising the Right to Economic Benefit to Host Communities 45 (2009) (unpub-
lished LL.M. Thesis, University of Pretoria).
130. About Royal Bafokeng Holdings, ROYAL BAFOKENG HOLDINGS (Nov. 2012), http://
www.bafokengholdings.com/m/files/rbh-factsheet-novl2.pdf.
131. Implats, Royal Bafokeng Holdings (June 2010), http://www.bafokengholdings.com/b/
invminimplats.php; see also Royal Bafokeng Holdings 2011 Integrated Review, ROYAL
BAFOKENG HOLDINGS (Apr. 2012) http://www.bafokengholdings.com/a/files/RBH annual-re
view 2011.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. RBH invests in other entities, apart from Implats. For example, RBH holds an
aggregate stake of 56.9%, translating to 93.82 million shares, in Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd, a
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holding company's portfolio was valued at 25.1 billion rand ($2.92 bil-
lion), according to its 2011 annual report. In 2010, it provided an 800
million rand ($92.92 million) dividend to the Royal Bafokeng Nation,
equal to about $620 per person."13 5
III. STRUCTURING COMMUNITY EQUITY PARTICIPATION
A. Options
Equity participation arrangements could take different forms based
on the objectives sought to be achieved by the parties and constraints
that they confront in the course of the undertaking. One option is the
Texas Relinquishment model discussed above. It may also take the
form of investing in the shares of an existing corporation involved in
natural resource exploitation in the area. This latter option is the ap-
proach adopted by South Africa's Bafokeng Nation. The Bafokeng
option may not be available to many communities hosting oil and gas
production because the oil companies and their multinational parents
might prefer to keep ownership within their respective corporate fam-
ilies.136 The fact that the oil companies operate in many communities
would also hamper allocation of stock in the companies to those com-
munities. If they are dealing with a community or two, and the possi-
bility of liquidating the company after operations cease in that
community, it would be easier to allot shares to the community as part
of the existing oil company.
Another equity participation option that is worthy of consideration
is the creation of joint ventures involving the government, energy
companies, and community corporations. This option is the focus of
this article. The concept of joint venture has business origins but has
been subjected to confusing treatment as jurists grapple with its true
meaning.1 37 Accordingly, joint ventures have been defined variously
by different scholars and judges.' One scholar persuasively argues
black-owned and controlled mid-tier platinum group metals producer. See About Royal
Bafokeng Holdings, supra note 130.
135. Jon Herskovitz, South Africa's "Richest Tribe" Offers Platinum Model, REUTERS (Oct.
19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-safrica-mines-bafokeng-idUSBRE89I1E
F20121019.
136. For instance, according to court filings in the Netherlands, all the stock of Shell Petro-
leum Development Company in Nigeria is owned by a subsidiary of the parent company, Royal/
Dutch Shell, a British registered company. Oguru, Efanga & Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell
Plc & Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd., No. 330891/ HA ZA 09-579 at 6. (2009). But see
Bosire, supra note 129, at 50 (suggesting a legal requirement to impose a Bafokeng-like arrange-
ment between multinational corporations and host communities in appropriate cases).
137. Talal Al-Emadi, Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs) among Current Negotiated Petroleum
Contracts: A Literature Review fJVCs Development, Concept and Elements, 1 GEO. J. INT' LAW:
THE SUMMIT 1, 2 (2010).
138. Id; see also WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 445 (3d
ed. 2001) (stating that the joint venture, "known variously as joint adventure or joint enterprise,
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that "it is not essential to have a water-tight definition" of the con-
cept.13 9 Attention should, instead, center on "the different legal forms
a joint venture can take to best serve the interests of the parties."14 0
Talal Al-Emadi presents a clear picture of the joint venture as follows:
The term joint venture as a form of business enterprise is clearly
rooted in the early history of Egypt, Syria, Phoenicia and Babylonia.
It originated 'as a commercial or maritime enterprise used for trading
purposes.' As a legal concept, however, it is still considered a recent
development. Historically, joint venture, or adventure as it was often
called, was viewed by the law as a branch of partnership. However,
the joint venture as a 'separate concept' with a similar relationship to
partnership was first developed in the United States and Scotland.
Some American courts, for instance, described the joint venture as
'special' or 'limited' or even 'informal' partnerships... However, there
is a general agreement that a joint venture is a strategic conglomerate
between two or more otherwise unrelated enterprises or organizations
engaging in a common undertaking with the hope of achieving a com-
mon goal. In other words, there are core elements that constitute a
joint venture and distinguish joint ventures from other existing legal
vehicles such as the partnership and corporation.141
Joint adventurers may adopt any legal form that suits their purpose,
such as a general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
company, or corporation, or they may simply define their relationship
under contract, as is the case with contractual joint ventures.142 From
these vehicles, one could also categorize the relationships as "incorpo-
rated joint ventures" or "unincorporated joint ventures."1 4 3
is difficult to describe adequately . . "). American courts generally treat joint ventures as a
species of partnership, characterized by a limited purpose and short duration. See, e.g., Blue v.
Rose, 786 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1986) ("There is no essential difference between a partnership
and a joint venture; they are factual relationships between two or more persons who conduct a
business enterprise together."); Paving Equipment of Carolina, Inc. v. Lake Providence, 51 F.3d
267 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A joint venture is governed by the same law as a partnership. The main
distinction between the two is that a joint venture is a temporary association for the purpose of a
single undertaking, while a partnership envisions a continuing relationship among the parties.").
Cf Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 747 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 2008) ("A joint venture is similar to a partner-
ship but is more limited in scope and duration, and principles of partnership law apply to the
joint venture relationship").
139. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 11-12.
142. Byron F. Egan, Joint Venture Formation, 44 TEXAS J. Bus. L. 129, 130 (2011) ("A joint
venture may be structured as a corporation, partnership, limited liability company ("LLC"),
trust, contractual arrangement, or any combination of such entities and arrangements."); Al-
Emadi, supra note 137, at 16.
143. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 16. While the term "unincorporated joint ventures" may
include joint venture partnerships, it is not always the case. See Steve Potter et al., Who's On
Top? A Comparison of Key Provisions of the Australian, Canadian, and U.S. Versions of Mining
Joint Venture Agreements, 56 RMMLF-INST 24-1 (2010), § 24.01 ("In Australia, most natural
resource JVs are unincorporated. Although the term "unincorporated joint venture" has not
been clearly defined, its wide commercial use has caused it to be recognized as an unincorpo-
1332013]
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B. Contractual Joint Ventures
A contractual joint venture is founded on a contract and is not
backed by any particular business form. Under this type of joint ven-
ture, the co-venturers co-own the project equipment and materials as
well as the oil and gas production.14 4 "This privilege is considered a
fundamental advantage of contractual joint ventures when compared
to joint venture corporations where shareholders do not have direct
ownership."1 45 Regarding control, an operating committee ("OC")
controls and manages the activities of the joint venture. With the ex-
ception of exploration and exploitation operations, the operating com-
mittee is under the sole control of the operator (subject to the OC's
supervision). In terms of risk, the co-venturers are unlimitedly liable,
and there is an equal distribution of liability because the parties are
jointly and severally liable for the venture's obligations.14 6 This huge
impediment that stems from the unincorporated nature of the contrac-
tual joint venture is avoided if the venture is structured as a corpora-
tion or limited liability company.147 The feature of unlimited liability
makes this a less attractive option for host communities.
C. Joint Venture Partnership
The joint venture partnership shares with the contractual joint ven-
ture similar features of direct ownership and access to oil and gas pro-
duction as well as project equipment and facilities. 148 They also share
the same exposure to risk.149 Some of the partners may avoid the risk
if the business is formed as a limited partnership, instead of a general
partnership.' However, this insulation is not without trade-offs. In a
general partnership, partners have an equal right to management,
whereas in a limited partnership, limited partners, in exchange for lim-
ited personal liability, do not exercise control of the business.51 It
should also be noted that while the default rule in general partner-
ships is that partners have equal footing in the management of the
rated common undertaking of individuals to generate product with a view to sharing such prod-
uct. [FN13] Unincorporated JVs are very much creatures of contract and, unlike partnerships or
corporations, have no statutory framework that specifically regulates them, which is, of course,
one of their advantages.") (Citation omitted).
144. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 19.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 665-66.
149. Id. at 666.
150. Id.
151. Id.; THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (3d. abridged ed. 2009).
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partnership; 152 this rule is often contractually altered by the partners
for ease of management. 5 3  "In practice, a management committee
consisting of representatives of the co-venturers is responsible for run-
ning the business."154 The interest of minority partners is protected
through a segregation and designation of "extraordinary" or "re-
served" matters which may only be decided with the consent of all
partners.1 55 That way, the managing partners do not take very impor-
tant decisions that are detrimental or burdensome to the minority
partners without their involvement and approval.'5 6
Another source of risk is that under partnership law, every general
partner is an agent of the partnership.'5 ' As an agent, the partner can
bind the partnership in the ordinary course of business, utilizing ap-
parent authority, even when the partner's actions were actually unau-
thorized by other partners, so long as the third party did not actually
know or receive notification of this limitation or lack of actual author-
ity. 5 s This risk can be eliminated or severely curtailed by removing
the agency powers of the partners not involved in management and
making the removal as public as possible.15 9
D. Joint Venture Corporation
In a joint venture corporation, the parties' ownership is "vested in
the shares of the corporation and is in proportion to the capital con-
tributed by each co-venturer."1 60 Accordingly, co-venturers neither
own nor have direct access to the oil and gas production, the project
equipment, and the project facilities.161 Instead, the joint venture cor-
poration, as a separate entity, independently owns these assets.16 2 The
152. See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 401(f) (2012) ("Each partner has
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.").
153. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 240 (2005) (dis-
cussing "delegation of management to one or more partners coupled with passivity by the other
partners.").
154. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 666.
155. Id. See also REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 401(j) (2012) ("An act outside the
ordinary course of business of a partnership and an amendment to the partnership agreement
may be undertaken only with the consent of all of the partners.").
156. Id.
157. See Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 666; REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 301(1)
(2012) ("Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business.").
158. See REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 301(1) (2012); see also Al-Emadi, supra
note 137, at 666-67.
159. For instance, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act enables a partnership to file a
"Statement of Partnership Authority" which outlines a partner's authority or any limitation on a
partner's authority. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303(a)(2) (2012); JESSE H. CHOP-
PER ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 702 (5th ed. 2000).
160. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 664.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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co-venturers, as shareholders, share in the proceeds of the produc-
tion.1 63 The control and management of the joint venture's affairs and
business reside in the board of directors ("BOD"), which in turn ap-
points the executive management to undertake the day-to-day opera-
tions of the venture, under the BOD's supervision.164 The import of
this structure is that shareholders have no direct role in the manage-
ment and operation of the venture. Nevertheless, the shareholders
elect the members of the BOD, and are free to cast the vote for them-
selves to sit on the board. Voting is usually pro rata, i.e. based on the
proportion of share ownership. 165
In practical terms, not much would change in terms of the control
exercised by the oil companies and national governments as compared
to the status quo, as the arrangement can be structured to give them
the percentage of shares that assures a continuation of management
and operational control. The communities are not completely short-
changed as they may also be afforded an opportunity, through the
community corporation, to elect one or more members of the BOD,
especially if the venture utilizes cumulative voting.166 A core and at-
tractive attribute of the corporation is the notion of limited liability,
which eschews personal liability and limits the liability of the investors
to their investment in the enterprise. 167 The joint venture corporation
itself, however, retains unlimited liability for its obligations. 168 More-
over, the supposed advantage of limited liability to shareholders may
also be exaggerated as in practice creditors may insist on "personal"
guarantees from the shareholders.169 In addition, "the joint venture
corporation may very well recover contributions from the sharehold-
ers in order to pay off its obligations."o
163. Id.
164. Id. See also JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 297-298 (7th ed. 2010).
165. See Bauman, supra note 164, at 337 (stating that "a shareholder is limited in the number
of votes she may cast for any given director to the number of shares she owns."); Al-Emadi,
supra note 137, at 664.
166. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 159, at 597 ("Cumulative voting is a system of voting for
the election of directors that is intended to give minority shareholders representation on the
board by allowing them concentrate their votes on a limited number of nominees.").
167. See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K., CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 276 (1st ed. 2006) ("Perhaps the most important difference
between partnerships and corporations involves liability to the outside world for the obligations
of the business. All partners are personally liable for a general partnership's obligations....
Shareholders of a corporation enjoy limited liability - i.e., a shareholder's losses are limited to
the value of his investment. . . . It is the chief reason that investors select the corporation over
the partnership form.").
168. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 665.
169. See Thomas K. Cheng, Form and Substance of The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate
Veil, 80 Miss. L.J. 497, 512 (2010); Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 665.
170. Al-Emadi, supra note 137, at 665 (citation omitted). There may be a concern that invol-
untary creditors, such as victims of pollution, may not receive adequate protection if the corpo-
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E. Suitable Option
This Article recommends that host communities opt for corpora-
tions or limited liability companies as the legal vehicle for executing
the joint venture. Each participating community should set up a com-
munity-owned corporation (COC) to be its instrument of participa-
tion in the joint enterprise. Community members would be the only
shareholders of the COCs.1 71 COCs would declare dividends on the
profits on a regular basis. Shareholders might be able to hypothe-
catel 7 2 their shares or borrow against the right to dividends. How-
ever, to avoid a hijack of the COCs, share transfer restrictions may be
instituted. These restrictions may not prohibit transfers outright as
that would render the restrictions void as against public policy, but
they may impose reasonable conditions on transfer, such as first op-
tion rights, right of first refusal and buy-sell provisions. 173 Obviously,
details of the COCs' features, specially tailored to serve their unique
purpose, will need to be worked out, including internal governance
structure, extent of shareholder empowerment and dispute resolution
mechanisms. Useful lessons may be drawn from the Alaska Native
Corporations established at the regional and village levels under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.1 7 4 The purposes intended to be
accomplished by the Alaska Native Corporations are particularly per-
tinent to the present proposal. 175
rate form is adopted, as opposed to unincorporated joint ventures. In reality, the concern may
be overblown. Tort victims will continue to be entitled to whatever available remedy and recov-
ery opportunity under the current scheme of things, if the energy company, government or com-
munity ever wishes to continue in business.
171. A similar structure was adopted by Alaska Native Corporations. For useful references
to the corporations, see infra note 163.
172. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 811 (9th ed. 2009) ("The pledging of something as se-
curity without delivery of title or possession.").
173. See Ragazzo & Moll, supra note 167, at 370-71 (listing and discussing types of share
transfer restrictions). See also Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes' Melting Subsistence
Rights, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 47, 80 (2010) (stating that no regional Native Corporation
in Alaska has amended its articles of incorporation to permit stock transfer to non-Natives).
174. For useful discussions of the Alaska Native Corporations, see Eric C. Chaffee, Business
Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A Critical Reexamination of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 107 (2008); Natalie Landreth & Moira Smith, Voting
Rights in Alaska: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JuST. 79, 83-84 (2007); Linda 0. Smiddy,
Responding To Professor Janda- The U.S. Experience: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) Regional Corporation As a Form of Social Enterprise, 30 VT. L. REV. 823 (2006)
(contrasting some Alaskan and Canadian native corporations); Gigi Berardi, The Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)-Whose Settlement Was It? An Overview of Salient Issues, 25 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 131 (2005).
175. See Smiddy, supra note 174, at 843 (stating that "the required use of the business corpo-
ration was intended to accomplish three purposes: to engage in economic activity; to use the
fruits of that activity to improve the social well-being of Natives; and to promote the economic
assimilation of Natives into the larger economy .... ) (citation omitted).
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The government may "carry" the COCs in the first few years of
participation in the joint venture, after which they can stand on their
own and make proportionate financial contributions to the joint ven-
ture. 17 6 When that happens, it would also free money for the national
government to invest in other sectors of the economy or segments of
the society. This new arrangement is likely to accelerate economic
development on a number of fronts. Tackling the concentration of
wealth in the government is almost condito sine qua non to addressing
corruption, which itself is a major drag on economic growth. Con-
versely, wealth de-concentration and re-distribution to the private citi-
zens will foster entrepreneurial pursuits through capital formation.
Beyond economic gains, the emergent middle class will drive and sus-
tain political progress. As historians and political scientists would ar-
gue, a vibrant middle class is essential to the emergence or at least
sustenance of democracy. In essence, there are numerous benefits to
equity participation, as Part IV amplifies.
IV. THE CASE FOR HOST COMMUNITY Eourry PARTICIPATION
A. Local Economic Development
The Bafokeng nation represents a rare example of a South African
community that has benefited appreciably from mining operations in
its territory.177 Some commentators capture the Bafokeng experience
in the following words:
The Royal Bafokeng Nation in South Africa is, however, an example
of how a community used the royalties received from platinum mining
companies on its land to ensure local development and empowerment
of community members. The Royal Bafokeng Administration en-
sured service delivery to the community which should have been the
responsibility of government. R2 billion was spent on infrastructural
development over a period of ten years, which included the 'provision
of 50 public schools, 10 clinics, two bulk water treatment plants and 17
176. Professor John Lowe describes what happens when a party chooses to be carried as
follows:
Electing to be carried means that the other owners will advance costs of drilling and com-
pletion, but the carried party will receive only a royalty on production until the parties
advancing the costs have recovered some multiple of their investment, after which the car-
ried party will "back in" to a share of the working interest in addition to or in place of the
royalty.
Lowe, supra note 98, at 30. See also id. at 50 (stating that in some variants of carried interests,
the agreement could provide that the person being carried "will receive none of the proceeds of
the production until the parties who put up the money to "carry" the interest receive some multi-
ple of the costs they have expended for the carried interest; usually the multiple ranges from
100% to 500%.") (emphasis added).
177. Lee Godden et al., Accommodating Interests in Resource Extraction: Indigenous Peo-
ples, Local Communities and the Role of Law in Economic and Social Sustainability, 26 J. EN-
ERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 12 (2008).
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reservoirs supplying water to the villages'. Although infrastructure is
built and provided by the Royal Bafokeng Administration, it is man-
aged by government. Other infrastructure includes the roads, electric-
ity, sewage systems, water provision and a sports centre while social
uplifting includes the provision of bursaries for tertiary education and
the establishment of small and medium-sized businesses within the
community. The nation receives approximately R180 million per year
from royalties and other commercial ventures. However, these ven-
tures are undertaken by the community itself and are not inspired or
provided for by mining companies. It is the community itself that en-
sures that the royalties are used to ensure the uplifting of the Royal
Bafokeng Nation.178
The Bafokeng story illustrates that when a community receives roy-
alties or dividends in substantial amounts, it stands a good chance of
successfully deploying them for local social and economic develop-
ment. Alaska Native Corporations have also adopted a similar ap-
proach of contributing to both economic development and
advancement of social welfare, including the provision of employment
for community members and scholarships to pursue educational
opportunities. 1 7 9
B. Wealth Retention
Local and national economic development is also likely to be aided
by the fact that equity participation will translate into greater reten-
tion of wealth in the domestic economy instead of transfers to off-
shore accounts by national elite and international investors. Professor
Duncan Kennedy has persuasively argued in a recent paper that Af-
rica's poor people are trapped in poverty, not necessarily because of
the combination of the poverty in the countries in which they live and
absence of adequate foreign aid from developed countries. 18 0 Instead,
the poor remain poor because they "are embedded in national and
international political economies that predictably direct economic sur-
pluses away from local reinvestment that might improve their situa-
tion through development."' 8 ' Kennedy places the blame at the feet
of domestic elites who "appropriate a large share of the surplus from
extractive industries, after the foreign share."' 82 He notes that "the
178. Henk Kloppers & Willemien du Plessis, Corporate Social Responsibility, Legislative Re-
forms and Mining in South Africa, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCEs L. 91, 114 (2008) (citation
omitted).
179. See Smiddy, supra note 174, at 838-841 (noting that some of the corporations have ex-
plicitly declared their dual economic and social welfare mandates and have pursued them
actively).
180. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 220.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 212.
2013] 139
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different groups that appropriate most of the surplus the economy
generates have very limited incentive to invest their part in the kinds
of enterprise that could over time generate poverty-reducing develop-
ment.""' At the end of the day, poverty subsists in Africa because
"the extremely poor do not have the resources but those who do have
other things to do with their money."' 84
Equity participation can help in addressing the problem and re-
dressing this anomaly by advancing domestic wealth retention. The
poor that are disenfranchised and marginalized by the current system
can be brought into the wealth-sharing circle. At the same time, those
newly-empowered will keep the bulk of the money within the local
economy since they lack the means or the need to siphon the funds
abroad.
C. Increased Income
A very attractive feature of equity participation is that it enables the
equity holders to share in the upside potential of the business.18 5 Ac-
cordingly, there is a good chance for communities to earn more
money from equity participation than from a fixed income arrange-
ment or government allocation of funds that remain static or experi-
ence modest increments from year to year. 186 With the extra funds
earned in boom years, the COCs may even extend their tentacles to
other ventures, for instance, investing in non-oil sectors of the econ-
omy. The opportunity provided by the corporate vehicle makes such
investments possible in the first place. 8 ' A COC may also establish
investment arms that handle its investment and diversification goals,
while it concentrates on its core mission of participating in the joint
venture. The importance of outside investments cannot be overem-
phasized as they would ensure that a COC is able to pay dividends
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Henry Simon Bloch, Financial Strategy For Developing Nations-Afterthoughts To The
Amsterdam Panel, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 797, 803 (1969) ("The great advantage of equity participa-
tion is that it permits participation in the increased value of the business.").
186. See Meredith R. Conway, With or Without You: Debt and Equity and Continuity of
Interest, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 261, 289 (2010) ("The traditional label of equity applies to an
instrument held by a shareholder in a corporation, which bears the risk of the corporation but
also reaps the rewards-greater risk for potentially greater reward. Conversely, the traditional
debt holder is typically given more of a guarantee in his instrument and more protection that he
will be paid back. Further, the debt holder typically receives a fixed return on his investment.
However, less risk often comes at the cost of limited opportunity to share in the growth of the
corporation.") (citations omitted).
187. Indeed, community members may form corporations to invest in various enterprises
directly or indirectly, without the existence of a joint venture as advocated here. But the availa-
bility of the corporation at the time additional revenues roll in can only help their investment
planning.
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even in a down year, in which the oil business has not been
profitable.188
D. Personal Capital
Another economic benefit of equity participation is that it can con-
tribute to the development of credit markets. The COCs will pay reg-
ular dividends to community members. These dividends could
provide an engine for human development and for entrepreneurial ac-
tivity in the area and beyond.s18  The dividend distribution will pro-
vide eligible citizens with a steady stream of income and serve as
enormous source of capital for business start-ups and additional capi-
talization for existing businesses.190 The COCs would also provide
each adult community member with shares that, subject to some re-
strictions, may be transferable and tradable, providing them with an-
other source of capital.191 In addition, the dividend entitlement can
serve as seed money giving people access to credit. The shares can
also be used as collateral to borrow against. In Africa, as with many
developing regions, lack of access to credit is a major hindrance on
entrepreneurship and development.19 2 As borrowing becomes an im-
portant part of the economic fabric, it will have the salutary effects of
stimulating small business, stimulating the growth of credit markets,
stimulating financial development, and entrenching laws of contract,
commerce, and property. 1 9 3
E. Social Capital
There are different types of capital, such as human capital, financial
capital and social capital, with varying degrees of utility and accessibil-
ity. Social capital is one of those concepts that are not susceptible to
188. See Travis G. Buchanan, One Company, Two Worlds: The Case for Alaska Native Cor-
porations, 27 ALASKA L. REv. 297, 332 (2010) (discussing the strategy of Alaska Native corpora-
tions to diversifying investments to ensure that dividends continue to go out to the shareholders
even if the corporation has a down year).
189. See Karol Boudreaux, From Curse to Cure, TCS DAIL (Oct. 19, 2004, 12:00 AM), http:/
/www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs daily/2004/10/from-curse-to-cure.htm (proposing a Nigerian Peo-
ple's Fund whose "dividends could provide an engine for human development and for en-
trepreneurial activity in Nigeria.").
190. See Jenny J. Yang, Small Business, Rising Giant: Policies and Costs Of Section 8(A)
Contracting Preferences For Alaska Native Corporations, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 315, 344-45 (2006)
(reporting dividend distributions by Alaska Native Corporations to community members
amounting to thousands of dollars to the average shareholder, which were sufficient to purchase
a vehicle or make a down payment on a house).
191. See Boudreaux, supra note 189 ("Nigerians might also be given tradable shares in the
Fund's unreserved account, providing them with another source of capital.").
192. See Thomas I. Palley, Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Dis-
tribution Funds: Oil and the Case of Iraq, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus 4 (Dec. 2003).
193. Id.
2013] 141
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an easy definition.19 4 Nonetheless, this Article embraces Robert Put-
nam's definition of social capital as consisting of "social networks and
the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness."19 5  Social
capital is an important ingredient for economic and political develop-
ment. 19 6 As one scholar has observed,
current wisdom suggests that social capital is, in fact, a productive as-
set that when present, enhances investment in physical and human
capital. If this is true, then social capital will be particularly important
in emerging neighborhoods-those neighborhoods that have histori-
cally been disadvantaged but that possess key assets and are poised for
development.' 97
Social capital positively affects wealth formation because with that
kind of capital, access to bank financing is enhanced and the recipients
of the loans can deploy them to build income-generating
enterprises.1 98
Equity participation is favorably disposed toward social capital be-
cause it can significantly contribute to strengthening the social fabric
in oil-producing areas. The economic and political opportunities cre-
ated by equity participation would encourage young productive com-
munity members, who would otherwise be prone to leaving the
communities and seeking opportunities elsewhere, to stay at home. 199
In other words, it will create residential lock-in, leading to the
strengthening of social capital in the form of neighborly relation-
ships.2 00 Professor Robert Ellickson argues that a nation's rate of resi-
dential mobility "is an underappreciated measure of the well-being of
a populace."2 01 He further observes:
Policies that foster freedom to move can benefit the members of a
relocating household in myriad ways. Moving to a different perma-
nent home may enable a person to secure, for example, a better job, a
more congenial set of housemates, and a dwelling with more suitable
194. Lisa J. Servon, The Value of Social Capital in Emerging Communities at 3 (The New
Sch. Univ., Cmty. Dev. Research Ctr., WORKING Paper No. 2002-005, 2002) ("Social capital is a
slippery concept to define; it has come to mean different things to different people.").
195. Quoted in Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-ins: Why French
Households Move Half as Often as U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373, 399 (2012).
196. See id. at 399 n. 142 ("Social capital may be valued not only because it leads to better
economic and social outcomes such as greater prosperity and less crime, but also because it can
stimulate feelings of self-esteem and solidarity that are valued for their own sake.").
197. Servon, supra note 194.
198. See Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights
of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 531 (2011).
199. The issue of brain drain is not unique to the host communities in Africa. See Merrill F.
Hoopengardner, Nontraditional Venture Capital: An Economic Development Strategy For
Alaska, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 357, 360 (2003) (discussing the brain drain of oil-rich Alaska's
brightest young citizens, which raises concerns about the state's economic future).
200. Ellickson, supra note 195, at 374.
201. Id.
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attributes. The freedom of a household to exit from a jurisdiction also
helps to discipline governments and enable Tiebout-style specializa-
tion among them. It is surprising, then, that civil libertarians seldom
exalt the freedom to move. Perhaps they have been all but silent be-
cause residential mobility can have a downside as well. Household
moves may cause. . . the "creative destruction" of informal relation-
ships among neighbors - a seemingly valuable form of social
capital.202
The longer the period of residence, the more likely the residents'
rootedness will translate into civic engagement, including involvement
in schools, community services and local politics.2 03 On the other
hand, mobility is negatively associated with the accumulation of social
capital as "a person who expects to move soon is likely, all else equal,
to devote less effort to developing local social capital."2 04
F. Alignment of Interests
Holding an equity stake could help assure the alignment of interests
between parties on opposite sides of a commercial relationship.2 05 For
instance, where corporate managers own equity interests in the corpo-
ration they manage, instead of salary as the sole or vastly dominant
form of compensation, their interests and those of the firm and its
other shareholders would tend to converge.20 6 Thus, they are likely to
take a closer interest in the firm's growth beyond their time of depar-
202. Id. (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 402 n. 157 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 402 (citation omitted).
205. See e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508
(2011) ("Firms compensate executives with equity in the firm in order to reduce agency costs.").
For a related, but different, explanation, see Andrew C.W. Lund, Compensation as Signaling, 64
FLA. L. REV. 591, 631 (2012) (discussing how incumbent managers' personal financial invest-
ment in the company signals to private equity firms that the company is likely to continue to be
profitable and therefore a worthy target for acquisition).
206. See Jesse M. Fried, Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of
Executive Pay, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2011) ("The purpose of equity compensation is to
better align executives' interests with those of the firm's shareholders.") (citation omitted); Jesse
M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 967, 1010 (2006) (stating that "equity compensation aligns the interests of employees with
those of shareholders."); Francine J. Lipman, Incentive Stock Options and the Alternative Mini-
mum Tax: The Worst of Times, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 337, 345 (2002) (quoting Congressional
position that giving an option to the "management of a business to have a proprietary interest in
its successful operation [would] provide an important incentive to expand and improve the profit
position of the companies involved.") (alteration in original); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J.
Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV.
1021, 1031 n.40 (1999):
[T]he conflict between managers and shareholders interests can be mitigated through the
use of incentive compensation packages which align the incentives of managers with those
of shareholders. Stock options can be used to provide managers with an equity interest in
the corporation. As executives' level of stock ownership increases, they will bear a greater
percentage of the costs of any deviations from the standard of profit maximization. In this
situation, self-interest will lead managers to act in shareholders' best interests.
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ture.207 While this good intention may be abused,2 08 there is much to
be said in favor of the idea that those who have "skin in the game"
would be more vested in its success.209 On the other hand, a misalign-
ment of interests may have a deleterious effect on the goals of at least
one of the parties to the transaction.210 This alignment of interests
also confers the coveted social license (discussed in the next section)
that is almost indispensable to successful development of minerals.
G. Social License
One irksome impediment to foreign direct investment in Africa is
resistance of host communities to the foreign investor's mission.211
Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis,
7 J. ACCTG & ECON. 11 (1985); Michael C Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and
Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990); Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G.
Sloan, Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. ACCTG &
ECON. 51 (1991).
207. See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Pledge (and Hedge) Allegiance to the Company 1
(Oct. 11, 2010) (ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY:
CLOSER LOOK SERIES: Topics, ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No.
CGRP-11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1690746## ("Compa-
nies include equity in a compensation package to align the interests of management with those of
shareholders. If the executive performs well, both shareholders and the executive will profit; if
the executive performs poorly, s/he will suffer financially along with shareholders. In this way,
equity compensation is expected to encourage a focus on long-term value creation."); Anup
Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency
Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377
(1996) (stating that agency costs may be reduced through increased holding of shares by
managers).
208. Managers might manipulate the situation to their advantage and neutralize the risk of
equity holding, for instance, by hedging their risks or by boosting the value of the stock prior to
their departure and cashing in on their investments. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking
Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367
(2000) (discussing the practice of hedging the risk of equity-based compensation by managers);
see also Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009).
209. See Stephen Bainbridge, The USA's Creditworthiness, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Jan. 13, 2011 12:02 PM) http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2011/01/the-usas-creditworthiness.
html ("I always lean towards trusting folks with skin in the game.").
210. For a discussion of the negative impact of misalignment of interests, albeit in the differ-
ent context of investment fund management, see Simon Wong, Tackling the Root Causes of
Shareholder Passivity and Short-Termism, THm HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 31, 2010, 9:41 AM) http://blogs.law.harvard.
edu/corpgov/2010/01/31/tackling-the-root-causes-of-shareholder-passivity-and-short-termism.
211. It should be stated that this situation is not unique to Africa. See generally Kurt
Strasser, Business Environmentalism: Good Works and Greenwash, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10216, 10221-22 (2012); LeRoy C. Paddock, Beyond Deterrence: Compliance and En-
forcement in the Context of Sustainable Development, 42 ENVrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10622, 10626 (2012); Bernardo Tobar, Investment Protection and the Rise of Sovereign Powers,
2011 NO. 3 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 1A (discussing corporate social license in Ecuador);
Kevin Fox, Development and Application of Stakeholder and Community Relations Policies in
the Development of a New Mining Project in Argentina, 2009 NO. 1 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO.
2A.
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There have been eruptions of violence in response to negative out-
comes of foreign investment.2 12 The resulting state of insecurity has
imperiled extant projects and threatened the emergence of fresh in-
vestments. This problem is particularly pertinent to, or especially evi-
dent in, the extractive industries of oil, gas and hard minerals such as
coal, copper, silver, gold and diamonds.2 13 Investors face the con-
straint that while they may have scaled all the legal hurdles and satis-
fied all the regulatory requirements to operate, they still lack one of
the most important ingredients for business success - the acceptance
of the community in which the operations are based. Scholars, advo-
cates and policy makers at national and international levels have
started weighing in on this issue of the 'social license' to operate.2 14
Social license entails the presence of host community goodwill and
favorable disposition or receptivity to proposed or on-going projects
in its domain or vicinity.21 5 The issue of social license would be appre-
ciably addressed through community equity participation in energy in-
frastructure projects. Equity participation introduces sufficient
structures for enduring political and economic development in the re-
gion and country at large. It also satisfies the lack of a sense of owner-
ship that, as earlier mentioned, is at the root of the problem.2 16 When
the state of Texas faced a major social license problem almost a cen-
tury ago, it responded with an equity participation approach that con-
tinues to be effective to this day.217 Accordingly, this Article
212. Jorge Paz Durini, Social License in Developing Countries, 54 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
25-1 (2008).
213. See Carole Ramsay, Corporate Social Responsibility as Economic and Infrastructural
Development: Economic Development for Protection of Investment Profit and Personnel, 57
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.17B-1 (2011).
214. See, e.g., SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRIETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,
PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, T 54,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008); Joo-Young Lee & Paul Hunt, Human Rights Responsibili-
ties of Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220,
224-25 (2012).
215. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Busi-
nesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 307 (2004) (stating that corporate
social license "governs the extent to which a corporation is constrained to meet societal expecta-
tions and avoid activities that societies (or influential elements within them) deem unacceptable,
whether or not those expectations are embodied in law.").
216. Id. at 320 n.16 and accompanying text.
217. Whitworth, supra note 115, at 680-81.
Leasing of the mineral classified lands was made difficult, however, by the severance of the
surface and mineral estates. Open warfare nearly erupted on such lands between producers
(the state's lessees) and the surface owners. These surface owners were understandably
reluctant to allow oil and gas producers to conduct operations on their property without
receiving appropriate compensation. To alleviate this problem, the legislature passed the
Relinquishment Act of 1919.
See also Terry I. Cross, Why Texas Titles Are Different, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., PAPER 16
(Sept. 13-14, 2007), at 9 (quoting judicial recitation of the hostile state of affairs at time of
2013]1 145
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recommends that African governments and energy companies operat-
ing on the continent focus on the issue from an equity participation
standpoint.
There is hardly any question that the integration of communities
into the energy economy is crucial to the peaceful and successful de-
velopment of the minerals.218 Instead of working tirelessly to sabo-
tage oil installations, including pipelines and manifolds, integrated
communities would work to protect and maintain them. 219 As some
commentators observe, "[t]he most likely option to end the menace is
to integrate the communities into the oil economy, so that they will
have proprietary interest in the protection of oil installations." 22 0 Eq-
uity participation presents an effective integration approach.
H. Energy Security
One commentator has noted quite accurately that "energy security
is a term often used but infrequently defined." 221 Energy security may
simply be defined as the presence of "an energy supply that meets or
exceeds demand, is reliable, and is provided at a reasonable cost."222
enactment of the statute); Patrick H. Martin, Royalty Issues on Lands Owned by State or Local
Governments, 33B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 5 (1993) (recounting the threat of armed conflict
between lessees and surface owners that was at the genesis of the enactment, and noting that the
state passed the act to accommodate the landowners).
218. Diana Klein & Ulrike Joras, Natural Resources and Peacebuilding: The Role of the Pri-
vate Sector, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10511, 10515 (2012); Siri Aas Rustad et al., Building or Spoiling
Peace? Lessons from the Management of High-Value Natural Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP,
10546, 10562 (2012) ("[Wjhere local populations have been excluded from formal contract nego-
tiations, firms bear the burden of seeking a 'social license to operate' from local communities or
risk long-term challenges to their operations ... company-community relations may thus become
central to preventing and alleviating local grievances.").
219. George K. Foster, Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting
Equilibrium Between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights, 33 Mwi-I. J. INT'L L. 627,
689 (2012) (referencing the point that absence of social license could lead to sabotage of installa-
tions or operations).
220. Ibaba Samuel Ibaba & John C. Olumati, Sabotage Induced Oil Spillages and Human
Rights Violation in Nigeria's Niger Delta, 11 J. Susr. DEV. AFR. 51, 62 (2009), available at http://
www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/V12NO2_Winter2009_B/Pdf/Sabotage%20Spillages%20and%20Hum
an%20Rights%20-%20reviewed.pdf.
221. Erica Downs, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China, The
Brookings Institute (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/
2006/12china/12china.pdf.
222. Dennis J. Hough, Jr., World Trade Organization Agreements and Principles as a Vehicle
for the Attainment of Energy Security, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 199, 202 (2010); Gawdat
Bahgat, Redefining Energy Security in the Persian Gulf, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 216
(2007) ("Energy security refers to sustainable and reliable energy supplies at reasonable prices.
Growing global interdependence on the energy market, however, argues for a more nuanced
definition that takes into account the following complex array of factors."). The United States
Energy Association provides a more complex definition as follows:
Energy security is a multi-faceted issue. In its most fundamental sense, energy security is
assured when the nation can deliver energy economically, reliably, environmentally soundly
and safely, and in quantities sufficient to support our growing economy and defense needs.
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The United Nations adds an impact component in its definition. 2 2 3 It
is hard to fail to notice "the growing salience of energy security on the
global agenda." 224  One component of a country's energy security
strategy is the diversification of supply sources.22 5 In the absence of
social license or the presence of development inequity, supply disrup-
tions are virtually inevitable. 2 26 Every country has a national interest
in uninterrupted flow of energy products even when interruption is
only happening in countries far removed from it or its source of im-
ports, because disruption in one area affects the rest of the world. Oil
is a global commodity. 227 By addressing these root issues, equity par-
ticipation fosters global energy security.
I. Anti-corruption Initiative
In several ways, equity participation will confront the legendary
corruption that has plagued Africa's oil-rich countries, and that is
aptly paraded as a veritable impediment to economic, social and polit-
ical progress.228 First, equity participation will reduce the amount of
To do so requires policies that support expansion of all elements of the energy supply and
delivery infrastructure, with sufficient storage and generating reserves, diversity and redun-
dancy, to meet the demands of economic growth.
Justin W. Evans, A New Energy Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: China, Russia, and
America's Triangular Security Strategy, 39 IND. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (2006) (quoting U.S. EN-
ERGY Ass'N, NAT'L ENERGY SECURITY PosT 9/11, at 7 (2002). Indeed, it should be pointed out
that "energy security is a term often used but infrequently defined." Downs, supra note 221, at
13.
223. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, WORLD ENERGY AssiESSMENT: OVERVIEw 2004
UPDATI 42 (2004), http://www.undp.org/energy/does/WEAOU full.pdf ("Energy security is a
term that applies to the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quanti-
ties, and at affordable prices, without unacceptable or irreversible impact on the environment.").
224. Maya Jegen, Two Paths to Energy Security: The EU and NAFTA, 66 INT'L J. 73, 73
(2010-2011).
225. Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 75-76)
("Experience has shown that to maintain energy security countries must abide by several princi-
ples. The first and most familiar is what Churchill urged more than 90 years ago: diversification
of supply.") available at http://www.un.org/ga/61/second/daniel-yergin-energysecurity.pdf; Bah-
gat, supra note 222, at 217 ("Security of supplies can be enhanced by an overall geological diver-
sification of supply. In other words, the development of several producing regions leads to more
stability in international oil markets. Thus, increasing supplies from Russia, the Caspian Sea,
West Africa, and other regions would reduce the vulnerability associated with overdependence
on any one region.").
226. See, e.g., Yergin, supra note 225, at 70 (stating that "scattered attacks on some oil facili-
ties reduced exports from Nigeria, which is a major supplier to the United States."); J. Shola
Omotola, "Liberation Movements" and Rising Violence in the Niger Delta: The New Contentious
Site of Oil and Environmental Politics, 33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 36, 38-39 (2010).
227. See Oil Prices at Nine Month High After Iran Dispute, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 20,2012,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/oil-prices-at-nine-month-high-after-iran-disp
ute-7220892.html (stating that oil prices to nearly a 9-month high in Asia after Iran announced
on February 19, 2012 that it had suspended crude oil sales to Britain on France).
228. See e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397, 400-01 (2002) ("Official corruption possesses such
corrosive potential that, if unchecked, it ultimately will destroy Nigeria. Corruption retards eco-
37
Duruigbo: Community Equity Participation in African Petroleum Ventures: Pat
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013
148 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:111
money available for looting by federal and state officials. 229 The
greater the involvement of the government in the petroleum industry,
the higher the chances of resources being siphoned by corrupt officials
who know that the state apparatus is not well-developed to police
such a vast economic space. Even in better-run societies, opportunists
exploit loopholes in government-mandated programs to enrich them-
selves. 230 Reducing the money available for squandering by a few will
redound to the good of the majority of the population, as resources
are decentralized and the circle of beneficiaries is expanded.
Anecdotally, there is evidence that even those who have little com-
punction about stealing public funds make a distinction and create a
wall of demarcation when it comes to money belonging to their towns
and villages. Apparently, they are quite aware that since they have
possessions within the community, their neighbors can extract their
proverbial pound of flesh, using means like ostracism and vandalism
that may not be available to the police and prosecutors. Many public
officials also care about their reputation among those that know them
best and among whom they expect to retire when they complete their
government assignments. Community members that turn a blind eye
to, or even celebrate the corrupt practices of their relatives in govern-
ment, are often intolerant of such tendencies when exhibited closer to
home. Accordingly, money transferred from public coffers into the
community purse is likely to find a safer home, thereby cutting cor-
ruption from the root.231
Corruption thrives in an atmosphere of unaccountability. Scholars
have surmised that a government closer to the people is likely to be
more effective and accountable.232 One of Africa's rare economic and
political success stories is Botswana which, despite having a considera-
ble endowment of diamonds, seems to have largely escaped the natu-
ral resource curse.233 Botswana's success has been explained partly as
nomic growth, distorts economic and political programs, undermines efforts to create viable eco-
nomic and political institutions, devalues the quality of human life, discourages foreign
investment, and undermines the prospects of a durable social order in Nigeria.") (citations
omitted).
229. See Palley, supra note 192, at 1.
230. See Ryan Tracy & Ben Lefebvre, Fraud Fears Put a Chill in Fuel Program, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 2012, at A5 (describing how participants were gaming a government-mandated program
aimed at jumpstarting new alternative diesel fuels industry by directing refiners to purchase
credits from small producers who would be out-competed by bigger rivals).
231. This point does not suggest that community corruption is non-existent; the point is that
it pales in comparison to corruption by government officials.
232. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 1-2 (2d ed. 2001) (stating
that "it has always been recognized that many functions can best be provided at the community
level, where the government is not a distant, dimly perceived entity, but is close to - and can be
kept responsive to - its constituents.").
233. Amelia Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule
of Law, and Human Rights Versus Economic Development, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
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resulting from the integration of traditional community institutions
into modern governance. 2 34 During colonial rule, some of these insti-
tutions were destroyed or emasculated in many other countries in Af-
rica. 2 35 The British colonial government retained such institutions in
Botswana to facilitate governance. 2 36 This development has turned
out to the advantage of the country.2 37 To the extent that equity par-
ticipation introduces or enhances community governance, it will pro-
mote accountability and displace corruption in the management of oil
revenues.
J. Democracy Development
Increased and dispersed wealth will lead to the creation of a viable
middle class, which some scholars view as an important ingredient for
the emergence or sustenance of democracy.23 8 When people are poor,
they lack the means, and perhaps also the desire, to agitate for democ-
racy, preferring to focus on how to satisfy their basic human needs for
food, clothing and shelter.2 3 9 Autocratic regimes thrive in such envi-
ronments and would prefer to keep the people destitute and desolate.
Accordingly, poverty has been viewed "as an incubator of dictator-
ships."2 4 0 Contrariwise, when people have moved beyond concerns
about basic needs, especially facilitated by a good education, they
PROBS. 453, 455 (2010) ("Achievements such as Botswana's noteworthy economic growth, politi-
cal stability, and regular elections often eclipse issues like human rights, which remain on the
periphery of most analyses of Botswana.").
234. Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Saving Iraq From Its Oil, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.!
Aug. 2004, at 83.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY:
LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE.MODERN WORLD 413-32 (1966); Gabriel Ardant,
Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations, THE FORMATION OF
NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 164, 231-32 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975) (discussing the
bourgeoisie's desire in nineteenth century France to participate in representative assemblies).
See also Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 69, 69 (1959), http://costa.wustl.edu/teaching/
IntroComp/Reading/Lipsetl959.pdf; Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization:
Theories and Facts, 49 WORLD POL. 155, 155 (1997).
239. Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human
Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TOURO INT'L L. J. 1, 10 n.22 (2001) (restating the full-belly thesis
that "until one's belly is full, one can't engage in the luxury of worrying about political rights.").
It bears mentioning that this notion is exploitable by political leaders who claim to accord prior-
ity to economic development and use that as an excuse to suppress citizens' civil and political
rights. See generally Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic
Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 Hum.
RTS. Q. 467, 469 (1983).
240. Eric Blumenson, Economic Rights As Group Rights, 15 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 87,
94 (2011).
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transition into demanding recognition and respect for their civil and
political rights.
In addition, replacing or diminishing government dominance of nat-
ural resource ownership will provide a fertile environment for the ges-
tation of political institutions. The government will tax citizen
earnings from the equity investment and the citizens will in turn de-
mand accountability from those extracting and spending the tax reve-
nue.241 As Nobel Economics Laureate Vernon Smith has remarked, a
central question that many societies needs to tackle is "whether the
people control government through voting and taxes or the govern-
ment controls the people through a monopoly of natural
resources."242
Moreover, equity participation gives the community members a
stake in their natural resource endowments. Similarly to taxation,
when people have a stake in their country's assets and resources, they
scrutinize the activities of public officials and insist on accountability
from them.243 Stake holding's importance cannot be overstated be-
cause it can serve the same purpose as taxation by propelling citizen
participation in governance.244 As earlier mentioned, taxation often
precedes a demand for representation because an alert citizenry un-
derstands that it has a stake in its money and the use to which it is put.
The same inclination and motivation would drive stakeholders to be
vigilant over assets held in their name and from which they derive
income.245 A sense of vigilance is a critical seed for the emergence
and sustenance of democracy. Finally, the corporations will aid com-
munity political development through the increased organizational
skills that community members will develop as they grapple with the
intricacies of organizing a significant portion of their life around the
corporations.246
241. Terry Lynn Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political and Economic Consequences, 4
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 661 (2004); See, e.g., TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF
PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 202 (1997) (citing Venezuela's and Iran's decreased
reliance on domestic tax revenue as immunizing government officials from accountability to the
public).
242. Vernon L. Smith, The Iraqi People's Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2003, at A14.
243. Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria:
The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 121, 191 (2004).
244. For a discussion of the benefits of stakeholding, see Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott,
Your Stake in America, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 249, 260-61 (1999).
245. Id.
246. See Berardi, supra note 174, at 137 (referencing the argument about enhancement of
organizational skills and political development in the context of the Alaska Native corporations).
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V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
A. Disruption of Existing Structure
One likely objection is that the proposed arrangement will disrupt
the existing structure that seems to serve energy investors well. Creat-
ing a multiplicity of entities, apart from the attendant disruption, also
adds to the cost of doing business.2 47 It may be that at the early stages,
the new arrangement would be expensive but after initial design,
other ventures would simply adopt and adapt the original structure,
instead of reinventing the wheel. Besides, the expected gains for all
and sundry, including the extractive industry and governments, in
terms of the benefits outlined in the preceding part certainly offset
and justify the additional expense.
B. Risk of Loss
Equity participation exposes equity holders to considerable risk.24 8
It could be argued that it is in the better interest of host communities
to be guaranteed a certain amount of money annually than to be ex-
posed to the risk of not receiving any money if the venture posts a loss
in any given year.24 9 Obviously, host communities would have to
carefully weigh the potential downsides of opting for an equity stake,
considering that in the investment world, risk and reward flow to-
gether.25 0 In any case, on this point equity participation is not worse
247. Policies that add to the cost of doing business are generally frowned upon, more so as
the costs get passed on to consumers or negatively affect hiring. For a sampling of criticisms of
legislative initiatives, judicial positions and executive programs on that ground that they increase
the cost of doing business, see Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk
And Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1287 (2012) (stating that opponents of a
proposed financial transaction tax "note that a new tax will impact market makers by increasing
their cost of doing business, in addition to affecting noise traders and speculators."); Irina Ober-
man, Maintaining the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Patent Invalidity Challenges in
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
439, 450 (2012) ("The Court's opinion also will increase the costs of doing business and thwart
innovation."); Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony Of International Business Law: U.S. Progres-
sivism and China's New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 354 (2011) ("Empirical research in
political science and economics demonstrates that because the U.S. regime increases the costs of
doing business in emerging markets, U.S. companies tend to invest less.").
248. David E. Brown, Jr. et al., Strategic Alliances: Why, How, and What to Watch For, 3
N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 76 (1999) ("There are significant risks related to an equity participation
arrangement. The participants can experience a complete loss of their investment.").
249. See Stephen Colt, Alaska Natives and the "New Harpoon": Economic Performance of
the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND, RESOURCEs & ENVrL. L. 155, 167 (2005) (stat-
ing that Alaska Native Corporations established for the benefit of native Americans in Alaska
on the average posted losses for many years).
250. See Chaffee, supra note 174, at 143 ("When a corporation fails to perform, the related
Alaska Native community suffers... the poor performance of many of the Native corporations
has done more to threaten Alaska Native communities than help them."). On the other hand,
many of the Alaska Native corporations have overcome the days of adversity and become pros-
perous over the years. See Gavin Kentch, A Corporate Culture? The Environmental Justice Chal-
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than some other options, like profit-sharing, in so far as they all de-
pend on the availability of profit before any distribution is made to
the communities.
C. Cultural Conflict
A corporation is an institution alien to the way of life in many a
local community hosting oil and gas operations.2 51 As a result, there
may be questions about the compatibility of corporate norms and de-
cision-making process with traditional practices.252 Writing about
Alaska Native Corporations, one commentator notes that the proxy
system utilized in corporate voting "has been criticized for being con-
fusing, advantageous to the incumbent Board, and antithetical to a
traditional culture of consensus-based decision-making."253 In addi-
tion, a corporation's focus is profit-making for its shareholders, while
community ethos often privileges the public good over private
benefit.254
Moreover, community members are likely to lack the necessary
level of knowledge and sophistication in business matters required to
function as active shareholders or constitute the board of directors
and senior management of the COCs. 255 One solution is for the gov-
ernment to include in the process of establishing these new joint ven-
tures, some funding for counseling on business and financial matters.
The funds would be used to organize information sessions on share-
holder rights and responsibilities, including the process of passing res-
olutions, amendment of by-laws and articles of incorporation, and
election of directors.256 The funds should also go toward providing
members of the board of directors and senior management with some
lenges of The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 81 Miss. L.J. 813, 818 (2012) ("After this
rocky beginning, however, the corporations have been more successful."); Daniel K. Oakes,
Inching Toward Balance: Reaching Proper Reform of The Alaska Native Corporations' 8(a) Con-
tracting Preferences, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 777, 787 (2011) (attributing the prosperity partly to pref-
erences, which some consider an unfair advantage, that was given to the Alaska Native
corporations in the public contracting process).
251. This problem surfaced in Alaska when Native Communities were required to set up
native corporations to hold land and manage some settlement funds. See Chaffee, supra note
174, at 132 ("The corporate form, however, is difficult to reconcile with traditional Alaska Native
culture."); Kentch, supra note 250, at 822 (stating that the corporate form's "appositeness to
Native culture can justly be questioned . . .").
252. See Smiddy, supra note 174, at 843 (referencing the point that the social values that the
corporation embodies are antithetical to the social values of traditional cultures that evolved
from participation of Native communities in hunting, fishing and gathering).
253. Kentch, supra note 250, at 823 (citation omitted).
254. See Chaffee, supra note 174, at 133.
255. Kentch, supra note 250, at 818 (stating that Alaska Native corporations experienced
poor financial performance in their first twenty years of existence partly because some of the
Native leaders did not fit in comfortably in their new roles as corporate executives).
256. See Chaffee, supra note 174, at 152.
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form of training on "basic business topics, including accounting, fi-
nance, management, and marketing. They should also receive exten-
sive training regarding their fiduciary duties and the unique
obligations that they have in representing a [host] community." 2 5 7
The ability of host communities to adapt into this new situation will be
a crucial factor in the success of this arrangement.2 5 8
D. Corporate Takeover
The notion of transferable shares in the community corporations is
fraught with one built-in danger: the possibility of a hijack of the cor-
poration by investors who are from outside the community.2 5 9 Cash-
strapped citizens may be persuaded to sell their shares for a pittance
to investors within and outside the community. 260 At a minimum,
these outside investors may not identify with the interest of the com-
munity and may not have a vested interest in the development of the
community or generally sympathize with the broad goals of commu-
nity equity participation.2 6 1 A more sinister prediction would be that
these investors could have a direct and hidden agenda of undermining
communal wellbeing from the outset. In any event, it could lead to
the creation of an oligarchy as highly valuable assets get concentrated
in the hands of a handful of individuals. "This movement from one
form of wealth concentration (on political leaders) to another form of
257. Id.
258. See Buchanan, supra note 188, at 299-301. Professor Linda Smiddy discusses the adapta-
tion of the corporation system to fit into Native life as follows:
Thus, although the NANA Regional Corporation is, by law, a for-profit business corpora-
tion, its form has been adjusted to serve both the economic and social benefit objectives of
the ANCSA and the Corporation. The modified governance structure provides a bridge
between the world of Western capitalism, with its attendant values, and the culture of the
Natives in the NANA region, for whose benefit it was created. Like its Makivik counterpart
in Canada, the NANA Regional Corporation discussed above created a hybrid structure
adapting traditional corporate forms to Native cultural traditions. In Makivik's case, the
principal corporation was a not-for-profit company. Here, in contrast, the Native regional
companies are business corporations. In both instances, however, the traditional legal form
was transformed. To the external world, NANA is a business corporation; but with respect
to its internal dealings, it has designed a decision-making form to reflect the values of the
culture it represents.
Smiddy, supra note 174, at 852 (citations omitted).
259. See Chaffee, supra note 174, at 142 (expressing similar concerns with Alaska Native
corporations and stating that the law "allows for takeovers of Alaska Native corporations by
non-Natives.")
260. There may be other reasons for sale, besides immediate need for cash. See, e.g., Yuliya
Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an International Phenomenon: Kazakhstan, 14 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1399, 1415 (1999).
261. See Smiddy, supra note 174, at 836 ("Over time, share alienation could eliminate the
ownership interests of the Act's intended beneficiaries and thus completely separate them from
the land."); Chaffee, supra note 174, at 142 ("Upon the sale of stock, Alaska Natives would be
left with no interest in institutions that were supposed to be created for their long-term bene-
fit.") (citation omitted).
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wealth concentration (on oligarchs) may not be in the best interest of
the country. It may also breed resentment, affect social trust needed
for economic growth, and fuel antipathy toward other proposals
aimed at economic growth." 2 6 2
A possible remedy is to introduce an effective mechanism of share
transfer restrictions that, for instance, places a moratorium on transfer
of shares for decades.2 63 While this may elicit objections from ardent
proponents of free enterprise, it is quite likely that the restrictions will
withstand strict scrutiny.26 4 Alaska Native Corporations employed
such strategy.265 Nevertheless, even if valid, such restrictions confront
formidable objections. Analyzing the issue in the context of the
Alaska Native Corporations, whose enabling legislation initially pro-
hibited alienation of shares for at least twenty years,2 66 Professor Ste-
phen Colt contends:
This prohibition removed the threat of takeover as a powerful disci-
pline mechanism and eliminated the actual takeover as a corrective
mechanism. Finance theory suggests that with no takeover threat and
no information feedback from a market in shares, shareholders would
be forced to monitor their corporation's performance in costlier and
less effective ways. The inability to sell shares blocks individuals' at-
tempts to diversify, which creates an artificial demand for corporate
diversification and may stifle productive but risky investment. It also
262. Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Resources
in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. Rvv. 33, 77 (2006) (citations omitted); see also
Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) (discussing how the pitfalls of Russian privatization had such an
effect); AMY CIlUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (discussing the dangers of wealth transfer or
concentration in the hands of a few individuals or a minority ethnic or religious group).
263. A provision in the by-laws, shareholder agreement or articles of incorporation restrict-
ing transferability may be rejected by the court if it imposes an absolute restraint on transfer. See
F.H.T., Inc. v. Feuerhelm, 211 Neb. 860, 320 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1982) (holding that the agreement
in question "constitutes a reasonable restraint on the power to transfer those shares held by the
contracting parties and covered by the terms of the agreement, and . . . does not impose an
absolute restriction on the alienability of the stock.").
264. Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding, 33 CARDozo L. REV. 1733,
1791 (2012) (stating that a ten-year restriction on transfer of shares will likely meet the reasona-
bleness requirement for the validity of such restrictions); F. Hodge O'Neal, Restrictions on
Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV.L.REV. 773
(1952) (rationalizing restrictions on free transferability of shares in closely-held corporations);
Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal.2d 283, 391 P.2d 828 (1964) (upholding a share transfer
restriction as necessary for the protection of a corporation and its shareholders and precluding
unwanted intrusions by outsiders).
265. See Buchanan, supra note 188, at 332 (stating that Alaska Native corporations "cannot
issue stock as needed or even alienate shares freely.").
266. Later legislation amended the provision to make the initial restriction on alienability of
stock in Alaska Native Corporations permanent unless a Native corporation's shareholders
voted to lift the restriction. See id. at 301.
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creates problems for shareholders with immediate cash needs- a con-
dition that certainly applied to many poor Alaska Natives.267
In a nutshell, Professor Colt notes that "[t]he shareholders' inability to
use 'exit' as a discipline mechanism clearly gives management, em-
ployees, and outside parasites more leeway to pursue their rent-seek-
ing objectives, including shirking, empire-building, or nepotism."26 8
While the points above are well taken, the absence of unqualified
exit is not necessarily a minus, as it could impel the activation of the
mechanism of voice.26 9 Voice denotes shareholder engagement with
corporate management to shape corporate policy. 270 Voice fosters in-
ter-constituency cooperation within the corporation, with sharehold-
ers working with corporate managers to fix what is wrong instead of
withdrawing at the slightest disaffection or disagreement with corpo-
rate direction.2 7 1 Many commentators believe that voice can be more
beneficial to the corporation than exit.2 72
E. Unintended Social Consequences
Equity participation may also introduce and solidify some unin-
tended and undesirable social consequences in the local communities
where it is implemented. Major lifestyle changes are likely to result
from putting large, unearned, sums of money in the hands of the peo-
ple. Some people will fail to invest their money properly, choosing
instead to use the income to fuel a life of conspicuous consumption in
an unhealthy manner. Cases of crime, alcoholism and other social
267. See Colt, supra note 249, at 158 (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
269. On the exit-voice phenomena, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND Lov-
ALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). A slightly dif-
ferent articulation of the concepts presents exit and voice as "variants of the same
phenomenon," rather than as alternate phenomena. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.:
The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 428-29 (2009) ("A buyer
having a real choice among a range of viable alternatives and the freedom to exit one potential
deal for a better one gives the buyer some measure of voice."); SARAH MAXWELL, THE PRICE IS
WRONG: UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES A PRICE SEEM FAIR AND THE TRUE COST OF UNFAIR
PRICING 76 (2008) ("Having a choice gives the consumers voice by allowing them to express
their opinion. They are not being forced to buy at one pre-set price or do without.").
270. J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991) ("Exit
is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of unsatisfactory performance.
Voice is the mechanism of intraorganizational correction and recuperation.").
271. For an extensive discussion of the value of voice in a close corporation context, see
Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Op-
pression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1229-38 (2009).
272. See e.g. Peter C. Konstant, Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Govern-
ance and Counsel's Changing Role, 28 J. Socio-ECoN. 203 (1999). This result is not limited to
corporations, but extends to other economic, or even political, institutions. See Petros C. May-
roidis, Book Review: Lexcalibur: the House That Joe Built, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 669, 670
(2000) (discussing how the virtual absence of opportunity to exit by member states led to the
amplification of voice and helped in the building of post-World War II Europe).
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vices are likely to rise.273 One example that is hard to forget is that of
the Samson Cree of Alberta, Canada who received more than $2 bil-
lion from the 1970s oil booms.274 The Cree introduced a dividend pro-
gram entitling each adult Cree to a dividend of about $40,000.275
Regrettably, the good fortune bred a string of sad stories as a signifi-
cant portion of the dividend money was squandered on personal con-
sumption, with concomitant high levels of alcoholism and death and
little improvement in the material well-being of the community.276 A
counter-argument is that it would be an exercise in excessive paternal-
ism to deprive communities of this option, simply because others be-
lieve their residents are ill-equipped to make smart life choices.2 77
F. Diversion of Public Resources
African countries generally lack good social infrastructure, state-of-
the-art medical facilities, and effective police outfits. In light of that, it
may be apposite to place emphasis and concentrate public resources
on the erection of durable physical infrastructure, adequate political
institutions, and social investment by public authorities, before any
serious attention is given to any form of wealth transfer to the citizens.
Accordingly, equity participation may be assailed for diverting needed
funds from building vital public facilities and needed social spending
for sound functioning of any society. The Alaska Permanent Fund,
which pays annual dividends to Alaska residents, has come under crit-
icism on that score, as the state has occasionally grappled with em-
ployee lay-offs and uncomfortable budget cuts that might have been
avoidable if it had retained the funds that were returned to the re-
sidents as dividend payments.278 The point about infrastructural de-
velopment and public investment generally is well taken, especially in
African countries that need them badly. Yet, there is scant reason to
believe that if equity participation is not introduced, currently availa-
ble resources would be devoted to these noble ends. After all, there is
hardly any public revenue allocated to equity participation today, yet
these investments are virtually non-existent. Besides, equity participa-
tion does not necessarily divert resources devoted to public infrastruc-
ture. It simply re-allocates the portion of public revenue that is
273. SVETLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN OIL WINDFALLS: WHO WILL BENEFIT? 47 (2003).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See Michael J. Sandel, Socratic Temptations, (reviewing JEFFREY ABRAMSON, MINERVA'S
OWL: THE TRADITION OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2009)) 89 TEx. L. REV. 687, 694-95
(2011) (discussing John Stuart Mill's influential critique of paternalism); James Gordley, Moral-
ity and Contract: the Question of Paternalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1754-55 (2007)
(offering a critique of paternalism).
278. See Tsalik, supra note 273, at 25.
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devoted to community development at the moment, and often
deployed inefficiently or lost through corruption at the corporate,
community and government levels.
G. Financial Constraints
In an earlier article, I discussed this challenge in the following
words:
One major issue that would need to be addressed is the source of
funding for community investment in these projects. Natural gas [and
oil] development projects are capital intensive, and it is unlikely that
communities would be able to mobilize the needed financial resources
to acquire a reasonable stake in these ventures. One suggestion is that
the federal government should advance non-recourse or limited re-
course loans to the communities for investing in the projects. These
loans will be paid back from the projects themselves, and communities
would be under limited or no obligation to repay if the projects fail. In
the long run, communities would be encouraged to seek independent
means of financing their investment, including sourcing for private
commercial borrowing and seeking the assistance of international de-
velopment and financial institutions."7
There is good reason to believe that such projects will attract the in-
terest of lenders. In the context of project finance, lenders routinely
advance loans that would be paid back from the projects
themselves.2 80
H. Political Challenges
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the tangible manifestation of equity
participation is the anticipated opposition of a corrupt, self-interested
and power-hungry political elite that would not be excited about los-
ing control of any contents of the public coffers. This problem is exac-
erbated by the existence of the minority-majority dichotomy in some
places where the natural resources (and primary beneficiaries of eq-
uity participation) are located in areas with minority ethnic groups
while political power is held by the majority ethnic groups. 8 1 Moreo-
ver, concerns that successful equity participation experiments could
entail disparate development outcomes for the oil-producing areas
and the rest of the country could also heighten the political tensions.
The saving grace here may be the fact that equity participation is rela-
279. Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria's Emergence as a Major
Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 448-49
(2009) (citations omitted) (hereinafter Duruigbo, Global Energy).
280. Loic Conan, The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline: An Overview of the Threats to Its Success
and the Means to Prevent Its Failure, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 218 (2011).
281. See Cyril I. Obi, Oil and the Minority Question, in THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN NIGE-
RIA 100 (Abubakar Momoh & Said Adejumobi eds., 2002).
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tively benign compared to other more radical proposals like 50 per
cent allocation to oil producing regions,282 total distribution of oil rev-
enues directly to the citizens 283 or complete private ownership of min-
eral resources.284
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a virtually incontestable fact that oil and gas development has
not been accompanied by elevated economic and political develop-
ment in many petroleum-producing countries, especially in Africa.
Reacting to the resulting economic inequity and social inequality, citi-
zens in oil-producing communities have started fighting back for a
more just development paradigm. This Article has argued that com-
munity members should be afforded some economic rights and invest-
ment opportunities through a system of equity participation in
exploration and production ventures. Thus, instead of joint ventures
between the national government and energy companies, we would
have a modified joint venture system involving the government, en-
ergy companies and community-owned corporations ("COCs").
Community members will be the only shareholders of the COC.
COCs would declare dividends on the profits on a regular basis.
Shareholders may be able to use shares as collateral for needed per-
sonal loans or borrow against their right to dividends. However, to
avoid a hijack of the COCs, share transfer restrictions may be put in
place.
The government may "carry" the COCs in the first few years of
participation in the joint venture, after which they can independently
and sustainably make proportionate financial contributions to the
joint venture. The government can then devote the freed money to
other sectors of the economy or segments of the society. This new
arrangement would propel economic development on a number of
fronts. It would reduce growth-stifling corruption by tackling the con-
centration of wealth in the government. De-concentrating and re-dis-
tributing oil wealth to the private citizens will foster entrepreneurial
pursuits through capital formation. Apart from economic gains, the
emergent middle class will drive and sustain political progress. A vi-
282. See Duruigbo, Global Energy, supra note 279, at 445 n. 410 (and accompanying text)
(discussing a rejection of an increased derivation proposal by a national political reforms confer-
ence in Nigeria).
283. See Moss, supra note 17; Palley, supra note 192; Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Sub-
ramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria (IMF Working
Paper No. WP/03/139, 2003).
284. For example, the Nigerian Bar Association has proposed the elimination of public own-
ership of oil and gas resources and its replacement with private or communal ownership. See
Duruigbo, People's Right, supra note 105 (analyzing the private ownership proposal).
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brant middle class is usually a major contributor to the emergence or
at least sustenance of democracy.
Equity participation will also provide a sense of ownership to com-
munity members in the oil and gas industry, which would curtail any
propensity for destruction of exploration assets or disruption of pro-
duction, giving much-needed breathing room to the government and
energy companies. The benefits will reverberate internationally in
terms of enhanced global energy security and stability.
49
Duruigbo: Community Equity Participation in African Petroleum Ventures: Pat
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013
